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Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage Among
Class-Privileged People of Color
Khiara M. Bridges*
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to begin to theorize the fraught space within which
class-privileged racial minorities exist—the disadvantage within their privilege.
The article posits that the invisibility of the racial subordination of wealthier
people of color (that is, their marginalization on account of their race) is fertile
soil for the germination of post-racialism—the sense that we, as a nation, have
overcome our racial problems. The dramatic visibility of the minority poor’s
suffering, combined with the relative invisibility of the suffering of those minori-
ties who are not poor, breeds the belief that class is now the main issue; it
breeds the belief that class is the thing that really matters. If, as post-racialism
suggests, class is the real problem, then we can, and ought to, dismantle any
racial stratification that we witness through race-neutral, class-based means.
But, if race remains a real problem—that is, if people and groups continue to be
disadvantaged on account of their race—then the class-based mechanisms will
not actually eliminate racial inequality. Thus, it is important for us to see the
race-based disadvantage that class-privileged people of color endure in order to
defeat post-racial thinking.
The article demonstrates that the illegibility of the racial subordination of
wealthier people of color is owed, in part, to our existing theories of racial
discrimination. It shows that our theories of racial discrimination have led us to
conceptualize economic disadvantage as constituting the entire universe of ra-
cial disadvantage. If economic disadvantage does, in fact, constitute the universe
of racial disadvantage, then those who are not economically disadvantaged (i.e.,
wealthier people of color) have not been racially disadvantaged at all. However,
the reality is that economic subordination is just one element of racial subordi-
nation. Racial discrimination has disadvantaged people of color not only eco-
nomically, but also socioculturally and politically.  Thus, if we are to bring
visibility to the racial subordination that wealthier people of color experience—
a visibility that may keep post-racial thinking at bay—then we have to theorize
the noneconomic injuries that racial discrimination inflicts.
This article begins this endeavor in Part I by documenting, again, class-
privileged racial minorities’ disadvantage. Part II then identifies how theory has
come to obscure this disadvantage. It shows that scholars have largely concep-
tualized two modalities of racial discrimination: individualist and institutional.
It then shows how scholars have conceptualized institutional racial discrimina-
tion as predominately affecting poor people of color; we think of it as the modal-
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ity of discrimination that bears the most responsibility for the poor’s spectacular
deprivation. Meanwhile, scholars have come to conceptualize the racial discrim-
ination that wealthier people of color encounter, when they encounter it, as usu-
ally of the individualist variety. This article calls this the discrimination-class
schema.
When scholars go on to deny the significance of individualist racial dis-
crimination in the post-civil rights era, the modality of racial discrimination that
wealthier people of color are imagined to encounter most often is dismissed as
insignificant in the contemporary present. This obscures the disadvantages that
this group experiences on account of its race. Part III goes on to identify other
contributors to the illegibility of class-privileged racial minorities’ racial disad-
vantage, naming as culprits the conceptual collapse of race and class, the use of
descriptive statistics, and explicit attestations that discrimination produces eco-
nomic disadvantages. Part IV then attempts to complicate the existing theories
of discrimination to remedy the problems that this article identifies. It proposes
avenues that race scholars might take in order to destabilize the discrimination-
class schema, identifying as paramount the necessity of theorizing noneconomic
categories of disadvantage.
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Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage Among
Class-Privileged People of Color
Silence is like starvation. Don’t be fooled. It’s nothing short of that, and felt
most sharply when one has a full belly most of her life. When we are not
physically starving, we have the luxury to realize psychic and emotional
starvation.1
INTRODUCTION
In February 2016, students at Harvard Law School (“HLS”) began to
occupy a student lounge in the Caspersen Student Center—renaming the
space “Belinda Hall” to honor an enslaved woman whose uncompensated
labor made her owners, the Royall family, so wealthy that they were able to
bequeath the funds that would establish HLS.2 The students, a collective that
called itself Reclaim Harvard Law, demanded that the school remove from
its official shield the crest of the Royall family, establish a Critical Race
Theory program and meet deadlines for hiring faculty members who could
teach courses in the program, reform the mandatory 1L curriculum so as to
expose HLS students in their first year to critical analyses of the relationship
between racial hierarchies and law, and take steps to ensure that low-income
students can attend HLS.3 They decided to occupy the space after the law
school administration failed to respond to their demands in a way that they
deemed satisfactory.4
The Reclaim movement incited many responses from observers—some
supportive, some unsympathetic. Responses in the latter camp frequently
gave voice to the sense that the student agitators lacked standing to lodge
any complaints against HLS. These skeptics denied that the student agitators
could justifiably complain about race because they denied that the student
agitators could be conceptualized as disadvantaged in any way. After all,
they were students at Harvard Law School.5 Reclaim’s critics often articu-
1 Cherrı́e Moraga, La Güera, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL
WOMEN OF COLOR 22, 23–24 (4th ed. 2015).
2 Claire E. Parker, Law School Activists Occupy Student Center, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 17,
2016, 9:43 PM), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/2/17/activists-occupy-wasserstein/
[https://perma.cc/V5B8-YPG3].
3 RECLAIM HARVARD LAW SCH., RECLAIM HARVARD LAW DEMANDS (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://reclaimharvardlaw.wordpress.com/demands/ [https://perma.cc/BL8W-9FWC].
4 See Parker, supra note 2. R
5 Consider coverage of Reclaim by The Daily Signal, a news site created by The Heritage
Foundation, a conservative think tank:
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lated the idea that to speak of a “racially disadvantaged Harvard student”
was, at best, oxymoronic; at worse, it was an exercise in sophistry.
The belief that there is no such thing as a “racially disadvantaged
Harvard student” is related to the broader societal tendency to conceptualize
class-privileged black people, and class-privileged racial minorities more
broadly, as unaffected by processes that burden them on account of their
race. The tendency is to think of them as immune from the practices and the
treatment that have conspicuously and devastatingly disadvantaged their
poorer brethren. We often do not see their marginalization.
The invisibility of the racial subordination of wealthier people of
color—that is, their marginalization on account of their race—is profoundly
problematic because it is fertile soil for the germination of post-racialism.
Post-racialism is the sense that we, as a nation, have overcome our racial
problems.6 It is an ideology that asserts that race is simply not as important
as it once was.7 It acknowledges that our racial past is horrible, but it de-
clares that the present is a brand new day. Post-racialism asserts that if racial
For months now, students and faculty at Harvard Law School have banded together
to create what they have labeled the ‘Reclaim Harvard Law Movement.’ While not
really a movement, these privileged students are making increasingly silly
demands. . . .
. . . .
. . . . [These student protestors] seek to benefit from the “privilege” that associa-
tion with Harvard Law School provides while at the same time employing the lan-
guage and tactics that cultural elites on the left have given them to engage in
behavior that . . . assuages their guilt for taking advantage of the many privileges that
their association with the school will provide.
Andrew Kloster, The Absurd Demands of Harvard Students Who Feel Guilty About Their
‘Privilege’, DAILY SIGNAL (Apr. 11, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/04/11/the-absurd-de-
mands-of-harvard-students-who-feel-guilty-about-their-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/VLY9-
W48W]. Consider as well responses to an article covering the Reclaim movement on The
Guardian’s webpage: “They’re at Harvard. They’ll be fine and they know it.” Fulton, Com-
ment to Jamiles Lartey, Racism at Harvard: Months After Protests Began, Students Demand
Concrete Change, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 8:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/educa-
tion/2016/apr/13/racism-harvard-law-school-slaveholder-seal [https://perma.cc/MUD8-
RJWX]; see also ID4368353, Comment to Jamiles Lartey, Racism at Harvard: Months After
Protests Began, Students Demand Concrete Change, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:40 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/apr/13/racism-harvard-law-school-slaveholder-
seal [https://perma.cc/786A-3BH7] (“Oh would that those in possession of the passport to
lifelong privilege conferred by Harvard would simply be grateful for that fact.”). Consider as
well a comment posted in response to the Harvard Law Record’s article about the student
agitation:
Do you think these legal beagle snowflakes are going to get out of school and open
free legal aid clinics in the big cities? Wake up. No, with a Harvard Law degree,
they’ll go to work for the man. They’ll end up in some corp legal herd or in the
government at the NSA or the FBI, etc.
Edward Raley, Comment to Marlen Thaten, Reclaim Harvard Law, Please Stop Destroying
Yourself, HARV. L. REC. (Apr. 4, 2016, 8:14 AM), http://hlrecord.org/2016/04/reclaim-harvard-
law-please-stop-destroying-yourself/ [https://perma.cc/5QT2-N7Q2].
6 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1601 (2009) (observing that post-
racialism contends that the nation has “transcended racial divisions of past generations”).
7 Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98
GEO. L.J. 967, 968 (2010).
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discrimination occurs today, it is an anomaly: a one-off occurrence that does
not disrupt the fact that, as a general matter, the nation is one in which
individuals and groups are not disadvantaged because of their race.8 Finally,
and crucially, post-racialism acknowledges that racial stratification exists in
the country. But it insists that such stratification is the effect of other
forces—namely class.9
Professors Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Trina Jones have in-
cisively explained why post-racialism is an ideology that we ought to resist
with all of our might. They write that “being post-racial eliminates the need
for policies that address the continuing legacy of America’s racist past,”10
like race-based affirmative action, race-conscious school integration plans,
and race-conscious protections of voting rights. They observe that:
Declaring U.S. society to be post-racial allows opponents of race-
based remedies and programs to seem noble rather than racist . . . .
[It becomes] possible to oppose race-based approaches without
seeming regressive. It allows those who oppose affirmative action
or the continuation of race-based remedies, like section five of the
Voting Rights Act, to take the moral high ground; they are the
ones who have moved on to a new, more enlightened era, while
8 See id. at 968 (“[P]ost-racialism is a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial
discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s and Americans’ pro-
nounced racial progress.”).
9 See Cho, supra note 6, at 1602 (“Theoretical post-racialists reject race-based remedies R
because they believe that such remedies obscure a more fundamental problem, typically one of
class-based injuries.”).
It is worth noting that there exists a significant contingent of people who believe that it is
not class that explains racial stratification, but rather individual behavior. The idea is that, if
racial minorities are overrepresented among those who are incarcerated, or if their life expec-
tancies are shorter, or if they find themselves living in segregated neighborhoods, the causes of
these outcomes are located in the individual. Racial minorities might inhabit a culture that
inclines them towards criminal behavior. See, e.g., OSCAR LEWIS, THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN FAMILY 465 (1961) (articulating the “culture of poverty”
theory, which claims that people are impoverished because they embrace values or engage in
behaviors that trap them and their families in a cycle of poverty). Or they might have problem-
atic genes that predispose them to early death; Dorothy E. Roberts, Is Race-Based Medicine
Good for Us?: African American Approaches to Race, Biomedicine, and Equality, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 537, 542–43 (2008) (noting “a renewed belief in inherent racial differences”
and observing that this belief places “the responsibility for ending health disparities on indi-
vidual health decisions or on taking race-based medications”). Or they might simply prefer to
live around other racial minorities. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.,
551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (offering that segregated neighborhoods
and, therefore, segregated schools, can result “from any number of innocent private decisions,
including voluntary housing choices”).
This article does not attempt to engage with those who believe that racial stratification is the
product of individual behavior—in large part because people holding those beliefs likely do
not believe that post-racialism is a problem; those persons are likely to believe that the nation
is, indeed, post-racial. This article is directed to those who believe that post-racialism is a
problem, who want to identify factors that led to the rise of post-racial thinking, and who are
interested in defeating this type of thinking.
10 Barnes et al., supra note 7, at 975. R
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those who are trying to continue race-conscious remedies are
mired in the past.11
This article argues that the relative hiddenness of the racial subordina-
tion that wealthier racial minorities endure has contributed to post-racial
thinking.12 When the subordination of wealthier racial minorities is not read-
11 Id. at 976.
12 This is not to argue that the racial subordination that wealthier racial minorities experi-
ence has been hidden entirely. Indeed, many of the conversations about race in legal scholar-
ship are about middle-class people of color. For example, race scholars have spilled a lot of ink
thinking about hate speech and hate crimes on college campuses—spaces that poor people of
color typically are unable to access. See, e.g., MARI MATSUDA, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITI-
CAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353,
354 (2009); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135 nn.11–12 (1982); Mari Matsuda,
Public Response to Hate Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2332–33 (1989). In a similar vein, one might say that the conversation about racial microag-
gressions is really about class-privileged people of color, as racial microaggressions are
thought to be significant when (or, perhaps, because) they happen to people of color who have
managed to access spaces that have been inaccessible historically to racial minorities and/or
who are thought not to “belong” in certain spaces (read: wealthier people of color). See, e.g.,
Daniel Solorzano, et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus Racial
Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC., 60,
70–71 (2000); Tara Yosso, et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus
Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 659–60, 672 (2009);
see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2000) (exploring the significance of “identity performance” for racial minorities who work in
exclusive, elite workplaces).
However, the debate around affirmative action demonstrates that although race scholars
have discussed issues that affect class-privileged people of color, they largely have failed to
demonstrate this group’s racial subordination. To explain, some commentators have attempted
to impeach the legitimacy of race-based affirmative action by observing that many benefi-
ciaries of these programs are class-privileged and, as such, have not really been disadvantaged.
See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES (2012). They
claim that those who need the most help—poor racial minorities—do not reap the benefits of
affirmative action programs. See id. Supporters of race-based affirmative action, in turn, have
defended these programs on a number of grounds. They have noted that the number of people
of color, specifically black and latinx people, in elite institutions would plummet if the pro-
grams were eliminated. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes,
and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s In A Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 832–33. They
have argued that the black middle class is a product of race-based affirmative action and the
perpetuation of this group depends on such programs. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirm-
ative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 950–51 (1997).
They have argued that in law school admissions, test scores do not actually measure whether
one will succeed in law school or in one’s legal career and, therefore, illegitimately identify
racial minorities as “unqualified” for certain institutions of higher learning. See, e.g.,
Onwauchi-Willing & Fricke, supra at 807, 830. And, of course, they have argued that racial
minorities bring a unique perspective into the classroom that benefits everyone in the environ-
ment. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003); see also Khiara M. Bridges, Class-
Based Affirmative Action, or the Lies that We Tell About the Insignificance of Race, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 55, 106–08 (2016) [hereinafter Class-Based Affirmative Action] (defending race-based
affirmative action by arguing that it is immoral to deny the continuing significance of race, and
the abandonment of race conscious programs performs that denial). However, only rarely do
defenses of affirmative action observe that those class-privileged people of color who do make
it into elite institutions have less wealth, are sicker, and die earlier than their class-privileged
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ily discernible, we perceive poor racial minorities as the only group that has
been affected by racially burdensome practices and processes.13 The dra-
matic visibility of the poor’s suffering, combined with the relative invisibility
of the suffering of those who are not poor, breeds the belief that class is now
the main issue—the thing that really matters. It breeds the belief that while
the racial inequality that we witness today might have had its origins in
racial issues, race no longer determines why people of color are on the bot-
tom of social hierarchies: class now makes those determinations. This belief
leads to the post-racial thought that if we want to dismantle the racial stratifi-
cation that we witness, we can—and ought to—do it through race-neutral,
class-based means.14
Thus, the aim of this article is to begin to theorize the fraught space
within which class-privileged racial minorities exist—the disadvantage
within their privilege. It begins this much-needed theorization by charting
how we have gotten here: a place where the well-documented marginaliza-
tion of class-privileged racial minorities is known (i.e., the wealth gap, racial
disparities in health, residential segregation), but nevertheless unnoticeable.
What has made it difficult for us to appreciate their subordination?
The article answers that the illegibility of the racial subordination of
wealthier people of color is owed, in part, to our existing theories of racial
discrimination. This article traces how our theories of racial discrimination
have come to obscure the discrimination that class-privileged racial minori-
ties experience and identifies how we ought to augment our theories of racial
discrimination so as to make the racial subordination of wealthier people of
color discernible.
This article observes that prevailing theories of racial discrimination
have led us to focus most of our attention on how racial discrimination has
produced the disproportionate poverty that people of color presently bear.
That is, we have come to focus on how the country’s history of racial dis-
white counterparts. That is, very rarely do defenses of affirmative action argue that class-
privileged people of color who benefit from affirmative action are actually disadvantaged. But
see generally Devon Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky, & Valerie Purdie-Vaughs, Privileged or Mis-
matched: The Lose-Lose Position of African-Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 174 (2016); Richard Rothstein, The Colorblind Bind, AM. PROSPECT
(June 22, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/race-or-class-future-affirmative-action-college-cam-
pus [https://perma.cc/DF98-CEMC]. Even rarer are defenses that argue that the wealthier ben-
eficiaries of race-based affirmative action, if disadvantaged, are disadvantaged in ways that are
structural and discursive and not in ways that are perpetrated by individual bad actors. See
discussion infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text. I take this to mean that the disadvantage
that class-privileged racial minorities have experienced on account of race is invisible in im-
portant ways.
13 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANG-
ING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 1–2 (3d ed. 2012) (“[W]hereas the previous barriers were usu-
ally designed to control and restrict the entire black population, the new barriers create
hardships essentially for the black underclass . . . . [W]hereas the old barriers bore the perva-
sive features of racial oppression, the new barriers indicate an important and emerging form of
class subordination.”).
14 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 12. R
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crimination is embedded in our class structure. This is true: our country’s
history of racial discrimination certainly is embedded in our class structure.
But it is risky to acknowledge this without simultaneously acknowledging,
loudly and often, that racial discrimination is embedded in places other than
our class structure. Indeed, this article contends that the failure to acknowl-
edge the fact that racial discrimination has had effects beyond class disad-
vantage—that racial discrimination has disadvantaged the economically
privileged—has helped to lead us to post-racialism and post-racial thinking.
Thus, our theories of racial discrimination have led us to conceptualize
economic disadvantage as constituting the entire universe of racial disadvan-
tage. If this is true—if economic disadvantage does, in fact, constitute the
universe of racial disadvantage—then those who are not economically disad-
vantaged (i.e., wealthier people of color) have not been racially disadvan-
taged at all. However, the reality is that economic subordination is just one
element of racial subordination. Racial discrimination has disadvantaged
people of color not only economically, but also socially, culturally, and po-
litically.15 Thus, if we are to bring visibility to the racial subordination that
wealthier people of color experience—a visibility that, possibly, may keep
post-racial thinking at bay—then we have to theorize the noneconomic inju-
ries that racial discrimination inflicts.
This article begins this endeavor in Part I by documenting, again, class-
privileged racial minorities’ disadvantage. Part II then identifies how theory
has come to obscure this disadvantage. It shows that scholars have largely
conceptualized two modalities of racial discrimination: individualist (which
is perpetrated by individual actors) and institutional (which usually takes the
form of race-neutral policies and practices that disproportionately burden or
harm people of color). It then shows how scholars have conceptualized insti-
tutional racial discrimination as predominately affecting poor people of
color; we think of it as the modality of discrimination that bears the most
15 I am reminded of an argument that literary theorist Saidiya Hartman makes in her ex-
ploration of racial domination during slavery and Reconstruction: while it was largely under-
stood that the Reconstruction Amendments were intended to end chattel slavery, it was unclear
just what exactly constituted chattel slavery. See SAIDIYA HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION:
TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 115–24 (1997). If
chattel slavery was nothing more than forced labor, then the Reconstruction Amendments were
only properly directed at ensuring that black people (and possibly others) were not forced to
labor anywhere. Thus, using the Amendments to address other forms of black marginaliza-
tion—along social, political, or cultural lines—was improper and a misapplication of the Con-
stitution. However, if chattel slavery was much more than forced labor—if it was also about
political inequality, about the construction of a racial hierarchy in which black people are the
despised bottom, about denying the humanity and dignity of the enslaved, about sexual and
sexualized violence—then the Amendments were properly directed at eliminating these forms
of subjugation as well.
To return to class-privileged racial minorities: if racial discrimination does nothing more
than cause economic disadvantage, then we properly direct our efforts to aiding those who
have suffered economic disadvantage. But, if racial discrimination is about much more than
economic disadvantage, then we ought to direct our efforts to undoing other forms of
marginalization as well.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\53-1\HLC106.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-MAR-18 11:16
2018] Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage 73
responsibility for the poor’s spectacular deprivation. Meanwhile, scholars
have come to conceptualize the racial discrimination that wealthier people of
color encounter, when they encounter it, as usually of the individualist vari-
ety. This article calls this the discrimination-class schema.
When scholars go on to deny the significance of individualist racial
discrimination in the post-civil rights era, the racial discrimination that
scholars imagine to affect wealthier people of color is dismissed as insignifi-
cant in the contemporary present. This obscures the disadvantages that this
group experiences on account of its race.  Part III goes on to identify other
contributors to the illegibility of class-privileged racial minorities’ racial dis-
advantage, naming as culprits the conceptual collapse of race and class, the
use of descriptive statistics, and explicit attestations that discrimination pro-
duces economic disadvantages. Part IV then attempts to complicate the ex-
isting theories of discrimination so as to remedy the problems that this
article identifies. It proposes avenues that race scholars might take in order
to destabilize the discrimination-class schema, identifying as paramount the
necessity of theorizing noneconomic categories of disadvantage.
A brief note before continuing: Liberal and radical race scholars fre-
quently call racial discrimination “racism.” Thus, they tend to speak of “ra-
cism” perpetrated by individuals and “racism” perpetrated by institutions or
structures. However, identifying a phenomenon as “racist” or an example of
“racism” frequently works to end conversations. When a speaker declares a
thing or person to be racist, it does not tend to invite listeners who are not
already sympathetic to characterizing the thing or person as racist to engage
with the speaker. That is, calling a thing racist does not lead persons who do
not already believe the thing to be racist to contemplate the characteristics of
the thing that has led the speaker to describe it as racist. Accordingly, I
largely do not refer to racism in this article, instead choosing to use the
language of racial discrimination. I do not make this choice because I be-
lieve the phenomena that I discuss in this article are not examples of racism.
Quite the contrary: I have been, and continue to be, an avid proponent of
labeling as racism the various mechanisms that function to shorten and re-
duce the quality of the lives of people of color in this country and around the
world.16 Instead, I make the choice to avoid the language of racism in this
16 Critical race theorist Ian Haney López offers an explanation for this choice that I find
particularly compelling.  In defending his choice to use the term “racism” when describing
race-neutral laws, policies, and programs that sustain racial hierarchies, López writes that iden-
tifying these practices as a form of racism is “an analytic and a political decision.” See Ian F.
Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2010).  He continues:
Referring to “racism” aims to evoke a sense of moral repugnance and social duty by
vivifying the fundamental injustice of entrenched racial inequalities . . . . To call
current racial patterns “racism” is to make a claim on that national moral obligation;
in contrast, to relinquish the notion of racism, and even of race, is to cede one’s claim
on the nation’s conscience.
Id. at 1071–72.
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article because I believe that for many readers, it will obscure more than it
illuminates. Thus, I largely speak of individualist racial discrimination in-
stead of individualist racism, and institutional racial discrimination instead
of institutional racism, although I believe that the terms in each pair refer
back to the same phenomena.
I. THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS: PRIVILEGED DISADVANTAGE, OR
DISADVANTAGED PRIVILEGE
How privileged is the black middle class? The answer that one gives to
that question may depend on to whom one is comparing the group. Gener-
ally, the black middle class is compared to their black counterparts without
class privilege—those folks who are sometimes referred to as the “under-
class” or the “urban poor.” When one compares the black middle class to
this “truly disadvantaged” group, the former seems to be doing better than
fine.17 They appear to be successful, living the American dream.18 As one
scholar recently put it, “Unlike the urban underclass, the black middle class
lives in a world filled with options. They are not restricted in the ways their
forbears were by segregation. They are members of not just a race, but also
an affluent, economic class.”19 Meanwhile, we rightfully conceptualize the
black poor as terribly subjugated by a range of mechanisms that seem to
make their indigence permanent.
However, when one compares the black middle class to their white
counterparts—that is, the white middle class—the picture becomes less rosy.
Indeed, it is when we judge wealthier racial minorities against those who
share their class privilege, as opposed to those who share their racial ascrip-
tion, that their subordination is thrown into sharp relief.
17 CHARLES T. BANNER-HALEY, THE FRUITS OF INTEGRATION: BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS IDE-
OLOGY AND CULTURE, 1960–1990 78 (1994) (“Among African Americans, opportunities con-
tinue to open up for the educated middle class while the urban poor appear stuck in a quagmire
of unstable families, intermittent employment, welfare dependence, and the temptations of
crime.” (quoting WILLIAM P. O’HARE ET AL., African Americans in the 1990s, POPULATION
REFERENCE BUREAU (1991)); ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 8 (1993) (noting
that many argue that any disadvantages that the black middle-class experience “pale by com-
parison with those of the underclass, the group that truly deserves our attention”); JOE R.
FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 34
(1994) (noting that we tend to look at the black middle class as evidence that “all blacks who
‘get it together’ and work hard enough can ‘make it’ in the United States”); Leland Ware &
Theodore Davis, Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Time: The Black Middle-Class in the
Age of Obama, 55 HOW. L.J. 533, 535 (2012) (“As we enter the second decade of the 21st
Century, an examination of the status of African American families reveals a mixed picture;
the best of times for some, the worst of times for others. For those in a position to take advan-
tage of the opportunities created by the Civil Rights revolution, the gains over the last genera-
tion have been remarkable. For those left behind in America’s impoverished communities, the
obstacles to advancement are more daunting today than they were a generation ago.”).
18 See Derrick Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79, 87 (1991)
(noting that the black middle class has achieved “a success that is both enviable and—many
whites and some blacks think—attainable by all blacks”).
19 Ware & Davis, supra note 17, at 539. R
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We can begin with their health. Studies have documented that racial
minorities endure increased levels of morbidity and mortality even when one
controls for class.20
Consider racial disparities in maternal mortality. Class-privileged black
women die during pregnancy and childbirth at rates that are significantly
higher than their white counterparts.21 That is, racial disparities in maternal
mortality rates persist across income levels. Now, many are aware that there
are racial disparities in maternal mortality in the U.S.; many may even be
aware of the specifics—that three to four times as many black women as
white women die on the path to motherhood.22 However, the tendency has
been to attribute this tragic disparity to poverty—to assume that because
black people in the U.S. disproportionately bear the burdens of poverty, this
disproportionate indigence is reflected in the rates at which black women die
during pregnancy, childbirth, or shortly thereafter.23 However, this assump-
tion is not entirely correct. It is not only poor black women who are dying on
the path to motherhood. Wealthier black women are dying, too; and they are
dying more frequently than wealthier white women. This means that it is not
solely poverty that is killing black women.
The excess mortality among wealthier black women attempting mother-
hood suggests many things. First, it suggests that race really does matter;24 it
can be the difference between health and sickness, life and death. Second, it
suggests that class privilege does not entirely erase the effects of the absence
of race privilege. For pregnant black women who find themselves at the
higher levels of the socioeconomic ladder, disadvantage persists despite their
class privilege.
20 See infra notes 22, 27, 28, 30 and accompanying text. R
21 AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN THE
USA: ONE YEAR UPDATE 7 (2011), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
deadlydeliveryoneyear.pdf [https://perma.cc/29ZB-ZRZU]  (“The risk of maternal mortality
has remained 3 to 4 times higher among black women than white women during the past 6
decades. Racial disparities were also seen in all income groups, with black women facing
approximately three times higher maternal mortality risk compared to white women at low,
middle, and high income levels” (emphasis added)).
22 Andreea Creanga, Cynthia Berg, Jean Ko, Sherry Farr, Van Tong, F. Carol Bruce &
William Callaghan, Maternal Mortality and Morbidity in the United States: Where Are We
Now?, J. WOMEN’S HEALTH, 23, 4–5 (2014).
23 I explore this phenomenon—where the public tends to believe that statistics that de-
scribe black people actually only reflect the black poor, thereby making invisible the marginal-
ization that the black middle-class experiences—in infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
24 It is important to emphasize here that I am not arguing that “race really does matter”
because race is in the genes and genetic differences between the races explain racial disparities
in health. I strongly reject biological notions of race. See Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous
Law of Biological Race, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 39–40 (2013) [hereinafter, Bridges, Dan-
gerous Law]. Instead, I am arguing that “race really does matter” because the racial categories
that we have socially constructed impacts individuals’ physical bodies; race matters because
our socially constructed racial categories influence whether individuals are sick or healthy and
whether they live or die.
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Further, the infants born to class-privileged black women die at rates
that are much higher than the babies born to their white counterparts.25 In-
deed, racial disparities in infant mortality and morbidity increase as one
moves up the income ladder. That is, the rates at which poor black babies
and poor white babies die are closer than the rates at which wealthier black
babies and wealthier white babies die.26 As one commentator put it, “con-
trary to what one might predict, these studies provide evidence that racial
differences are larger among women perceived to be at lower risk for poor
outcomes.”27
What is true with respect to racial disparities in infant mortality is true
as a general matter: Racial disparities in health tend to increase as one
moves up the socioeconomic ladder.28 In other words, poor black people and
poor white people sometimes have levels of health that are more comparable
to one another than the levels of health of wealthier black people and wealth-
ier white people. This suggests that our antipoverty programs have managed
to make race have less of an impact on poor people’s health.29 This is a
25 See Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Racial Differences in Health: Not Just Black and
White, but Shades of Gray, 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 411, 416 (1996) (conducting a survey
of the literature and reporting that “[f]our of the five studies of infant mortality . . . found
higher mortality rates among African American than white women of a similar social strata”);
Kenneth C. Schoendorf et al., Mortality Among Infants of Black as Compared with White
College-Educated Parents, 326 NEW ENG.  J. MED. 1522, 1523 (1992) (“The infant mortality
rate in the college-educated black population was 10.2 per 1000 live births, whereas the infant
mortality rate in the college-educated white population was 5.4 per 1000 live births. After we
adjusted for age and parity, time when prenatal care began, and marital status, the likelihood of
death for a black infant was 1.82 times that for a white infant . . . .”); CDC, Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Infant Mortality Rates—60 Largest U.S. Cities, 1995–1998 (Apr. 19, 2002),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5115a4.htm [https://perma.cc/7TZR-
A336] (“Racial disparity in [infant mortality rates] has not been explained fully by differ-
ences in socioeconomic status. Black infants born to college-educated parents have higher
[infant mortality rates] than white infants born to parents of similar educational background
. . . . Education of the mother does not confer the same level of protection against infant
mortality among black women as it does among white women.”).
26 See Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 429 (“Studies of infant outcomes provide R
evidence that racial disparities persist within each social stratum, but are most pronounced for
women in higher socioeconomic positions.”).
27 Id. at 417; see also J.W. Collins, Preterm Birth Among African American and White
Women with a Lifelong Residence in High-Income Chicago Neighborhoods: An Exploratory
Study, 17 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 113, 115 (2007) (noting that “[e]xploratory data show that
African American women unexposed to the health-eroding consequences of early-life and cu-
mulative exposures to neighborhood poverty still have a twofold greater preterm birth rate than
their White peers”).
28 See James S. House & David R. Williams, Understanding and Reducing Socioeconomic
and Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health, in PROMOTING HEALTH: INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
FROM SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 89, 105 (B.D Smedley & S.L. Syme eds., 2000)
(noting that for many health indicators, “the racial gap becomes larger as [socioeconomic
status] increases”); Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 429 (“One would expect that dis- R
crimination based on income and race would translate into low-income African Americans
having worse health outcomes relative to low-income whites. Surprisingly, however, racial
disparities were found to be less dramatic among the poor than the nonpoor when examining
data for all causes [of death].”).
29 See Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 429 (arguing that if racial disparities in health R
are smaller amongst those with lower incomes, then “social welfare programs in health and
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triumph, undoubtedly. But, it reveals that something that cannot be fixed by
antipoverty programs is threatening the health of people of color. That some-
thing, of course, is race.30
That racial disparities in health persist across income levels could mean
several things. It could mean that the private health insurance plans that
class-privileged racial minorities have, and the fact that they can use that
insurance to access private hospitals and doctors, does not necessarily trans-
late into their receiving the same quality of care that their class-privileged
white counterparts receive.31 Stated bluntly, racial disparities in health across
income levels could mean that physicians have racial biases (be they implicit
or explicit), and these biases cause them to offer people of color a lower
quality of care. There is evidence to support this possibility.32 For example,
studies have shown that, even when one controls for differences in insurance
status, age, income, and co-morbidities, providers offer black people less
effective treatment for heart disease and kidney disease, making it less likely
that black people will receive coronary artery bypass surgery or kidney
transplantations.33 As one report stated, “[E]ven after adjusting for severity
of illness, [socioeconomic status] and/or insurance status, blacks are less
likely to receive a wide range of medical services than are whites.”34
income maintenance . . . may have prevented poor blacks from doing any worse that poor
whites”).
30 See House & Williams, supra note 28, at 96 (noting that “the most important implica- R
tion of th[e] finding [that there are racial disparities in health even among those at the top of
the socioeconomic ladder] is that it is not just the material, psychological, and social condi-
tions associated with severe deprivation or poverty (such as lack of access to safe housing,
healthy food, and adequate medical care) that explain socioeconomic inequalities in health”).
31 See COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING & ELIMINATING RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE & BD. ON HEALTH SCIS. POLICY, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 5 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y Stith, & Alan R.
Nelson eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT]  (“Evidence of racial and ethnic dispar-
ities in healthcare is, with few exceptions, remarkably consistent across a range of illnesses
and healthcare services . . . . [R]acial and ethnic disparities remain even after adjustment for
socioeconomic differences . . . .”).
32 UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 31, at 2–3 (citations omitted) (“Relative to whites, R
African Americans—and in some cases, Hispanics—are less likely to receive appropriate car-
diac medication or to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery, are less likely to receive perito-
neal dialysis and kidney transplantation, and are likely to receive a lower quality of basic
clinical services such as intensive care, even when variations in such factors as insurance
status, income, age, co-morbid conditions, and symptom expression are taken into account.”);
House & Williams, supra note 28, at 98 (citations omitted) (“Many studies have found racial/ R
ethnic differences in the receipt of therapeutic procedures for a broad range of conditions even
after adjustment for insurance status and severity of disease. These disparities exist even in
contexts where differences in economic status and insurance coverage are minimized, for ex-
ample, the Veterans Administration Health System and the Medicare program.”).
33 See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 31, at 2–3. R
34 David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, US Socioeconomic and Racial Differences in
Health: Patterns and Explanations, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 349, 367 (1995). Also disturbing is the
fact that racial minorities are more likely to receive procedures that are widely considered
undesirable. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that African American
Medicare patients are 2.4 and 3.6 times more likely to be castrated or to have their limbs
amputated).
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The fact that racial disparities persist even when one controls for class
could also mean that there is something unhealthy about living in a social
environment in which one is a racial minority;35 it could mean that enjoying
class privilege does not entirely eliminate the unhealthy quality of that envi-
ronment. There is evidence to support this view as well.36 What is important
about this research is that it demonstrates that it is not only poverty that is
shortening the lives of racial minorities, as it is so often assumed.37 Rather,
race is also abridging and reducing the quality of the lives of racial minori-
ties, including those with class privilege.
We can look beyond health for evidence that race disadvantages
wealthier racial minorities. Consider their experiences in the housing market.
Wealthier black people live in less affluent homes and neighborhoods than
their white peers.38 The neighborhoods in which class-privileged black peo-
ple live tend to be closer to poor black neighborhoods39 and, as a conse-
quence, tend to feature the social dislocations (crime, poorer quality schools,
35 Being a racial minority does not have to mean, as a matter of necessity, that one’s social
environment is unhealthy. One can certainly imagine social environments in which racial mi-
norities are culturally, socially, and politically valued. In such an environment, the fact of
inhabiting a body that is racialized as a minority one likely would not be a health- and life-
limiting proposition. Thus, if the unhealthiness of the social context in which racial minorities
live partially explains racial disparities in health across income levels in the U.S., then it is
important to acknowledge that there is nothing inevitable about that unhealthiness.
36 Jen’nan Ghazal Read & Michael O. Emerson, Racial Context, Black Immigration and
the U.S. Black/White Health Disparity, 84 SOC. FORCES 181, 181 (2005) (stating that prelimi-
nary evidence shows that black immigrants to the U.S. only enjoy levels of health that are
comparable to white U.S.-born persons when these immigrants hail from countries that are
majority black, and noting that their levels of health approximate U.S.-born black persons
when they hail from countries that are majority white).
37 See Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 428 (“Disproportionately high rates of pov- R
erty among minority Americans have led many to assume that racial differences in social class
account for persistent racial disparities in health.”).
38 Bart Landry & Kris Marsh, The Evolution of the New Black Middle Class, 37 ANN.
REV. SOC. 373, 388 (2011) (noting that the black middle class lives in less affluent neighbor-
hoods than their white counterparts) (citing Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan and Brian J.
Stults, How Segregated are Middle Class African Americans?, 47 SOC. PROBS. 543, 554
(2000)); Malamud, supra note 12, at 970 (observing that “blacks, regardless of their income R
level, own worse houses in worse neighborhoods—a pattern that extends even to middle-class
suburban blacks”); Ware & Davis, supra note 17 at 563 (“Blacks live in neighborhoods that R
are, on average, 15 to 20% less affluent than other groups with a comparable status.”).
39 SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDER-
MINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 135 (2004) (noting that black middle class neighborhoods
“usually provide the buffer from ghettoes for the rest of society”); Malamud, supra note 12, at R
969 (“The black suburban middle class is segregated into black enclaves near the fringe of the
ghettos it has escaped.”); Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the Signifi-
cance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, 72 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 163, 168 (2009) (“[P]ublic and other low-income housing projects had long been
relegated to border black middle-class neighborhoods, while distant white neighborhoods were
protected from such encroachments.”); Ware & Davis, supra note 17, at 563 (“[M]any subur- R
ban blacks live in older, inner-ring suburbs that are less affluent, less white, and have higher
levels of crime and social disorganization than suburban communities where comparable
whites reside.”).
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etc.) that poverty so often causes.40 The consequences of residential segrega-
tion for people of color are many, and most of them are bad. As Bennett
Capers summarizes it:
Entrenched segregation tends to deny racial minorities equal ac-
cess to jobs, government resources, amenities, and . . . quality
schools. Segregation also tends to disproportionately burden racial
minorities with society’s detritus: Power plants and hazardous
waste facilities, group homes for the mentally disabled, halfway
houses, shelters for the homeless, and public housing projects.41
Part of the issue is that class-privileged black people find it difficult to
live in racially integrated neighborhoods; while the neighborhoods in which
they live are more racially integrated than those in which their poorer coun-
terparts live, they nevertheless are quite segregated.42 The pattern is that
white residents of a neighborhood will tolerate a certain number of black
people as their neighbors. But after a certain threshold is reached, white
residents will move out.43 It does not matter that the black people moving
into a neighborhood share their white neighbors’ class privilege.44 What mat-
ters is that black residents are black.
40 Landry & Marsh, supra note 38, at 388 (noting that middle class black people “live in R
areas with more negative characteristics, such as poverty, more female-headed households, and
fewer college graduates than middle-class whites” and that they “are more likely to be ex-
posed to environmental hazards than are their white counterparts”).
41 I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 44–45
(2009).
42 Andrew L. Spivak & Shannon M. Monnat, The Influence of Race, Class, and Metropol-
itan Area Characteristics on African-American Residential Segregation, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1414,
1432 (2013) (“[W]hile poor ($14,999 or less) black households live in neighborhoods that
are, on average, 61 percent black and 28 percent white, affluent ($1,00,000 or more) black
households live in neighborhoods that are, on average, 45 percent black and 44 percent white.
The difference across income groups, while significant, also illustrates the strong influence of
race for even the most affluent (6.7 percent) of black households . . . . Even as greater income
allows some members of a group to translate their class gains into residential mobility, biases
associated with race continue to stratify African Americans into neighborhoods that are far
more segregated than those of their white class counterparts.” (emphasis added)).
43 CASHIN, supra note 39, at 136 (observing that “[w]hen migrating blacks reach a critical R
mass, whites flee”); DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES
LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 58 (2014) (“The racial composition of neighborhoods changes
quickly once the numbers reach a certain threshold or ‘tipping point.’”).
It may be important to note that it is incorrect to believe that “white flight” is a practice that
happened at mid-century, but no longer happens in the “modern” present. Instead, white flight
is an enduring feature of the U.S. landscape. See Daniel T. Lichter, et al., Toward a New
Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and
Suburbs, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 843, 845–46 (2015) (noting that there has been an increase in
white people “concentrating in places that are overwhelming[ly] white, especially at the
metro fringe” and that many white families are “hunkering down in all-white neighborhoods,
affluent gated communities, or unincorporated housing developments at the exurban fringe”).
44 CASHIN, supra note 39, at 156 (“[A] concentration of racial minorities—particularly of R
black people—can and often does lead to a decline in access to and influence of dominant
institutional actors that shape markets . . . . Empirical studies show that commercial disinvest-
ment in majority-black communities, even affluent ones, is commonplace.”); McFarlane,
supra note 39, at 182 (“[S]egregation leads to lower land values, less money for public educa- R
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Moreover, the white people with whom wealthier black people share
neighborhoods tend not to share their black neighbors’ socioeconomic status;
that is, their white neighbors tend to be poorer than they are.45 Further, when
wealthier black people create enclaves of their own—middle- and upper-
middle black communities—these neighborhoods are not comparable to the
ones that their wealthier white counterparts create. Despite the residents’
class privilege, these communities do not attract the businesses, jobs, shops,
amenities, and investment that make neighborhoods covetable and comforta-
ble.46 The constellation of all of these facts has led some researchers to con-
clude that, despite the class privilege of the black middle-class, “race
powerfully shapes their residential options.”47 Race matters. Indeed, “at no
point do blacks attain residential parity with whites—that is, the communi-
ties in which they reside have less affluence and other less desirable charac-
teristics (e.g., more crime) than the communities where whites with similar
personal and household characteristics are found.”48
We can also look to income and wealth for evidence that race disadvan-
tages wealthier racial minorities. Studies have shown that black profession-
als earn 75% to 85% of the incomes that their white counterparts earn.49 Part
tion, reductions in school quality, and fewer commercial amenities located in and around black
segregated neighborhoods. Thus, middle class black persons are still suffering from highly-
disadvantageous segregation.”).
45 Alba, Logan & Stults, supra note 38, at 556 (noting that “middle-class blacks tend to R
live with whites who are less affluent than they are”).
46 CASHIN, supra note 39, at 156 (“[A] concentration of racial minorities—particularly of R
black people—can and often does lead to a decline in access to and influence of dominant
institutional actors that shape markets . . . . Empirical studies show that commercial disinvest-
ment in majority-black communities, even affluent ones, is commonplace.”); McFarlane,
supra note 39, at 182 (“[S]egregation leads to lower land values, less money for public educa- R
tion, reductions in school quality, and fewer commercial amenities located in and around black
segregated neighborhoods. Thus, middle class black persons are still suffering from highly-
disadvantageous segregation.”).
47 Alba, Logan & Stults, supra note 38, at 544. R
48 Id. at 556. The fact that class-privileged racial minorities live in poorer and more ra-
cially segregated neighborhoods than their class privilege ought to allow reduces their “social
capital—that varied bundle of resources and connections we have at our disposal, sometimes
without realizing it, as a result of our social relationships.” Capers, supra note 41, at 50. Those R
who live in more affluent neighborhoods have access to more affluent neighbors, who might
have valuable information to share about sundry, but potentially impactful, topics, including
job opportunities, investment tips, estate planning, and college admissions advice. Affluent
neighbors might also share access to their friends and colleagues, who also might be rich in
social capital. Essentially, residence in a more affluent neighborhood increases access to privi-
lege and networks of privilege—something that can have profound material consequences.
Economist Glenn Loury was willing to conclude decades ago that because of racialized differ-
ences in access to social capital, “equal opportunity laws cannot be relied on to eliminate
economic differences between the races, even over the long run.” Glenn Loury, A Dynamic
Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT 153, 156
(P.A. Wallace & A. LeMund eds., 1977). Thus, the inability of wealthier people of color to live
in integrated neighborhood despite their class privilege disadvantages them in innumerable
ways.
49 See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 55 (4th ed. 2013) (referring to studies
that show that “blacks earn less than whites at every educational level” and that “even as
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of the reason for this disparity is that black professionals tend to be em-
ployed in the public sector, which does not pay as much as the private sec-
tor.50 Further, when black professionals work in the private sector, they
disproportionately work in positions regarding “minority affairs;” these are
positions that concern managing the business’s relationship with racial mi-
norities (in the workplace, in the marketplace, or in the “community” that a
business’s products or services affect).51 These jobs tend to pay less than
other positions, and they tend to lack the opportunities for promotion that
other positions have.52
Racial disparities in wealth are even more dramatic: College-educated
black people hold about 13% of the wealth that their white counterparts
hold.53 Indeed, “[t]he poorest white families—those in the bottom quintile
of the income distribution—have slightly more wealth than black families in
the middle quintiles of the income distribution.”54 The disparity here is ex-
traordinary: while white families whose heads hold a college degree have on
average $180,500 in wealth, black families with similarly credentialed heads
have almost an eighth of that wealth—$23,400.55 While black families with
incomes between $54,000/year and $93,000/year have $36,430 in wealth,
white families in that income bracket have almost four times that much—
$136,390.56 It is important to observe that the reason why class-privileged
black people have less wealth than their white counterparts has nothing to do
with spending habits. Rather, it has everything to do with the weight of accu-
mulated racial subordination. As legal scholar Deborah Malamud puts it,
“all of the multi-generational disadvantages the black middle class suffers in
housing, occupational segregation, education, and income translate into
lower lifetime earnings, diminished return on housing capital, diminished
blacks move up the occupational hierarchy, their income falls further behind their white
peers”); Landry & Marsh, supra note 38, at 385 (“Depending on the year and groups com- R
pared, researchers found estimates of black income percentages of white incomes of 85%
among upper-middle-class black and white males and females in 1988 . . . ; 79% among black
and white dentists and lawyers in 1990; and 76.3% among black and white professionals in
1990 . . . . [B]lack males with post-baccalaureate degrees received only 74% of their white
peers’ income in 2000.”).
50 Elizabeth Higginbotham, Black Professional Women: Job Ceilings and Employment
Sectors, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 113, 119 (Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie Thorn-
ton Dill eds., 1993) (noting the concentration of black professionals in the public sector).
51 See COSE, supra note 17, at 65 (“[B]lack executives have landed, out of all proportion R
to their numbers, in community relations and public affairs, or in slots where their only rele-
vant expertise concerns blacks and other minorities.”); FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 17, at R
162–63 (noting that many black managers and professionals have been “ghettoized in posi-
tions oriented to affirmative action, special markets, or minority communities”).
52 See COSE, supra note 17, at 64–65. R
53 DARRICK HAMILTON, ET AL., UMBRELLAS DON’T MAKE IT RAIN: WHY STUDYING AND
WORKING HARD ISN’T ENOUGH FOR BLACK AMERICANS 3 (2015).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 7.
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likelihood of inheritance of wealth from parents, and therefore into reduced
wealth accumulation over the life course.”57
Some might be tempted to argue that the disparities documented here
are not caused by race, but rather are merely correlated with race. Indeed,
the most likely alternative explanation for disparities in health and housing is
wealth. The argument is that if one compares people of color with white
people who hold similar amounts of wealth, then any apparent disadvantages
will disappear. This is simply not true. Racial minorities are steered to differ-
ent, poorer neighborhoods without respect to the amount of wealth that they
hold.58 Without regard to their ratio of assets to debt, racial minorities with
“black sounding” names (like Lakisha and Jamal) receive fewer job inter-
views than persons with “white sounding” names (like Emily and Greg).59
57 Malamud, supra note 12, at 983. Lacking wealth, of course, leads to other disadvan- R
tages for class-privileged black people. See, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE, WEALTH PATTERNS AMONG
THE TOP 5% OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 21 (2014) (“Several studies prior to the 2008 real estate
crisis show that, even at higher levels of income, African-Americans had less access to prime
lending than white families at the comparable income level.”); Devah Pager & Hana Shep-
herd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing,
Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 190 (2008) (citations omitted) (refer-
ring to studies that demonstrate persistent racial disparities in the mortgage market, including
that “‘even at the highest income level, blacks are almost three times as likely to get their
loans from a subprime lender as are others’”); Ware & Davis, supra note 17, at 571 (discussing R
studies that “found that African Americans were less likely than whites to receive loans from
regulated lenders” and “that regardless of lender type and income level, African Americans
were more likely than whites to receive higher priced loans”).
Of course, receiving less favorable loan terms and being shunted to the subprime loan mar-
ket may not be due to the smaller amounts of relative wealth that black applicants possess, but
rather may be due more directly to their race. See CASHIN, supra note 39, at 36–37 (“Even R
after controlling for differences in creditworthiness, studies have found large differences in
mortgage loan denial rates between minority and white applicants. And often minorities who
are successful in obtaining a mortgage receive less generous loan amounts and terms . . . .
Blacks living in predominately black neighborhoods are frequently redlined by mainstream
mortgage lenders and are forced to rely on the predatory loans made available by the subprime
market.”).
58 See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 31, 55–56 (2013); George C. Gal-
ster and Erin Brooke Godfrey, By Words and Deeds: Racial Steering by Real Estate Agents in
the U.S. in 2000, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 251, 260 (2005).
59 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 991, 997–98 (2004) (demonstrating that “Asian sounding” names and “foreign sound-
ing” names, in addition to “black sounding” names, are also penalized in the labor market);
see also RUPA BANERJEE, ET AL., DO LARGE EMPLOYERS TREAT RACIAL MINORITIES MORE
FAIRLY? A NEW ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN FIELD EXPERIMENT DATA 2, 5 (2017) (reporting that
individuals with names suggesting Indian, Pakistani, or Chinese origin were 28% less likely to
receive an interview in Canada); Magnus Carlsson & Dan Olof Rooth, Evidence of Ethnic
Discrimination in the Swedish Labor Market Using Experimental Data, 14 LAB. ECON. 716
(2007) (showing that applicants with “Swedish–sounding names” received 50% more
callbacks than identical applications with “Middle Eastern sounding names”); Sonia K. Kang,
et al., Whitened Resumes: Race and Self-Presentation in the Labor Market, 61 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
469, 491–92 (2016) (showing that Asian individuals could double their chances of receiving a
callback interview if they made their names more “white sounding” and eliminated from their
resumes any references to race-based organizations to which they may have belonged); Philip
Oreopoulos, Why Do Skilled Immigrants Struggle in the Labor Market? A Field Experiment
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White people will begin moving out of a neighborhood when the number of
black residents reach a certain number irrespective of the wealth possessed
by their neighbors of color.60 Indeed, calling many of the disparities itemized
above race-based disadvantages is no mistake. Race—not class—causes the
inequality.61
***
In light of the documented disadvantages at which class-privileged
black people find themselves,62 it is a wonder that anyone could proclaim
that this group is doing just fine. Nevertheless, that is precisely what one
hears in the debate around race-based affirmative action. At the very top of
the list of things that opponents of race-conscious programs identify as sim-
ply wrong about these efforts63 is their tendency to benefit class-privileged
black people.64 This group of beneficiaries, they argue, does not need help.
with Thirteen Thousand Resumes, 3 AM. ECON. J: ECON. POL’Y 148, 168 (2011) (showing
discrimination against “Asian sounding” names in the labor market in Canada).
60 See CASHIN, supra note 39; ROITHMAYR, supra note 43.
61 It is important to note that while the research indisputably establishes that class-privi-
leged black persons endure race-based burdens in housing, employment, health, and other
domains, the weight of the research establishes that nonblack people of color also endure
similar race-based burdens. See MARGERY A. TURNER, ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLI-
TAN HOUSING MARKETS: PHASE 2-ASIANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS, 1-1, 3-6 to -11 (2003)
(concluding that “significant discrimination against . . . Hispanic homeseekers still persists in
both rental and sales markets of large metropolitan areas nationwide” and showing that, al-
though people of Asian descent are often excluded from research on racial discrimination in
the housing market, realtors and brokers do not inform prospective Asian buyers and renters
about available properties and do not give them the same information about financial assis-
tance that they give their white counterparts); MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: PHASE 3-NATIVE AMERICANS 4-1 (2003) (showing that
indigenous renters and homebuyers endure greater discriminatory treatment in the housing
market than black, Latinx, and Asian renters and homebuyers); Bertrand & Mullainathan,
supra note 59 (citing studies documenting that nonblack people of color have less favorable R
outcomes in the labor market when they have “nonwhite sounding” names). Thus, this is not
solely a story about the race-based disadvantages that class-privileged black people encounter.
This is a story about race-based inequality, more generally.
62 We might add to the list of items that serve as evidence that the black middle class
endures racial subordination in spite of their class privilege the fact that black middle-class
students do not perform as well as their white peers on standardized tests. See Malamud, supra
note 12, at 978 (noting that the educational performance gap “is not solely caused by poverty;
it exists across the socioeconomic spectrum” and that “[b]lack middle-class children do
worse in school than (seemingly) similarly situated white middle-class children”). However, I
conceptualize this truth as an effect of all of the other types of racial subordination identified
here, rather than an independent item. See, e.g., id. (“Black middle-class suburban schools
score only a little better than poor city schools, in part because black suburban schools have
high proportions of low-income students.”).
63 I itemize the entire list of reasons that opponents of race-based affirmative action give
for their opposition in Bridges, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 12, at 80–94.
64 See KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 12, at 5 (citing research showing that “86
percent of African Americans at selective colleges were either middle or upper class” as a
reason to oppose race-based affirmative action); Malamud, supra note 12, at 939 (“To its
critics, one of the flaws of race-based affirmative action is that its main beneficiaries are eco-
nomically privileged members of the eligible minority groups.”); Antonin Scalia, The Disease
as Cure: “In Order To Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH.
U. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (1979) (articulating that he opposes race-conscious admissions pro-
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They are class-privileged, after all. If anyone needs help, they argue, it is the
poor. And, as a general matter, race-based affirmative action does not bene-
fit poor people.
It is true that poor students generally do not benefit from race-conscious
admissions programs;65 it is also true that educational institutions should
make efforts to ensure that they include poor students. However, these facts
say nothing about the propriety of race-based affirmative action programs.
Class-conscious admissions programs and race-conscious admissions pro-
grams are not mutually exclusive; they both can be appropriate and just.
However, opponents of race-based affirmative action argue that race-
conscious programs, unlike their class-based counterparts, are inappropriate
and unjust. They argue that these programs are illegitimate, in part, because
they benefit members of the black middle class—persons who are not disad-
vantaged, they argue.66 The evidence that this is simply not true is not hard
to find. Something has made it impossible for us to see or to take seriously
this disadvantage. What follows in the subsequent Parts is an attempt to ex-
plain this invisibility.
Again, it is paramount that we see and take seriously the disadvantage
that class-privileged people of color experience because the invisibility of
this disadvantage makes post-racial thinking more tenable. Post-racialism,
which asserts that race simply does not matter anymore, thrives in a context
in which poor people of color appear to be the only people of color who are
disadvantaged. If indigent people of color are the only people of color who
are burdened, class appears to be the best explanation of their suffering.
grams because he is “not willing to prefer the son of a prosperous and well-educated black
doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—to the son of a recent refugee from Eastern
Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get his family ahead”).
65 See KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 12, at 5 (showing that poor students of color
are rarely admitted to universities via race-based affirmative action programs).
66 Justice Thomas made this argument during his Senate confirmation hearings.  When
asked to describe what he thought was wrong or unfair about race-based affirmative action
programs, he said, “I believe it . . . doesn’t say that this kid has to come from a disadvantaged
background, it doesn’t say that the kid has to have had problems in life.  It is race-specific, and
I think we all know that all disadvantaged people aren’t black and all black people aren’t
disadvantaged.  The question is whether or not you are going to pinpoint your policy on people
with disadvantages, or are you simply going to do it by race.” Nomination of Judge Clarence
Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 360 (1991) (statement of J. Clarence Thomas).  Prior
to this statement, Thomas had articulated support for affirmative action programs like the ones
from which he had benefitted, saying that affirmative action programs back in his day were
engaged in “an effort to determine whether kids had been disadvantaged, had socioeconomic
disadvantages.” Id. at 358. Thus, to Thomas, socioeconomic disadvantages count.  Because
only some black people have these socioeconomic disadvantages, only some of them have the
disadvantages that count.  It is, therefore, unfair to implement programs that uniformly give
black people “preferences” in admission because such programs will benefit black people
without socioeconomic disadvantages.
What Thomas (and many, many others) miss here is that socioeconomic disadvantages do
not constitute the universe of disadvantage.  One can be advantaged socioeconomically, but
disadvantaged in a range of other ways.  See discussion infra notes 184–85 and accompanying
text.
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However, class cannot explain the burdens that class-privileged people of
color endure. Instead, race must explain those burdens (and, likely, the bur-
dens that poor people of color endure as well). It is for this reason that it is
imperative for us to see the race-based burdens that class-privileged people
of color experience in order to see that race continues to matter. And if we
see that race continues to matter, the assertion that we have finally arrived at
a post-racial society is placed on unsustainable grounds.
II. THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BINARY
When one canvasses the literature, one notices the emergence of two
definitions of racial discrimination. Scholars and commentators almost inva-
riably identify a form of discrimination that is the product of individual
action and a form of discrimination that is the product of institutions/struc-
tures. This is the racial discrimination binary—the idea that, together, indi-
vidualist racial discrimination and institutional/structural racial
discrimination constitute the universe of racial discrimination.67
The racial discrimination binary has functioned to obscure the race-
based discrimination that class-privileged people of color experience, as its
logic leads to the discrimination-class schema (which proposes that institu-
tional discrimination is the primary cause of poor racial minorities’ subordi-
nation while individualist discrimination is the form of racial discrimination
that more affluent racial minorities encounter when they chance upon it).
The logic of the discrimination-class schema leads, in turn, to the proposi-
tion that the racial discrimination that wealthier people of color typically
67 See e.g., STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLIT-
ICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (1967) (“Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two,
closely related forms: individual whites acting against individual blacks and the total white
community against the black community. We call these individual racism and institutional
racism.”); Ashley Doane, Racial Discourse and Racial Politics, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 255, 267
(observing that “the key division in the debate over the nature of racism is between the defini-
tion of racism as individual attitude or behavior (hatred, stereotyping, unequal treatment) and
the view of racism as a set of systemic and institutional practices”); Gilbert C. Gee & Chandra
L. Ford, Structural Racism and Health Inequities: Old Issues, New Directions, 81 DU BOIS
REV. 115, 116–17 (2011) (“[T]he metaphor of an iceberg is useful for describing the levels at
which racism operates.  The tip of the iceberg represents acts of racism, such as cross-burn-
ings, that are easily seen and individually mediated.  The portion of the iceberg that lies below
the water represents structural racism; it is more dangerous and harder to eliminate.”); Ian F.
Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimina-
tion, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1811 (2011) (“Purposeful racism is directed racial status-enforce-
ment motivated by an intent to discriminate harmfully. Institutional racism is directed or
undirected racial status-enforcement influenced in an unrecognized manner by racial institu-
tions.”); Pager & Shepherd, supra note 57, at 182 (noting that scholars have created a “two-
part definition” of racism that includes “individual discrimination” alongside “institutional
processes”); William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in American Today: An In-
troduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (noting that “sociologists have distinguished between two
manifestations of racism: [t]raditional racism, of the Jim Crow, Ku Klux Klan variety” and
“[s]tructural racism, also known as institutional racism”).
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endure is unsystematic, trivial, or nonexistent. This proposition leads, in
turn, to post-racialism. The balance of this Part unpacks this claim.
Before beginning, it is worth noting that, in reality, the dichotomy be-
tween individualist and institutional discrimination is a false one. Apparent
acts of individualist discrimination are frequently informed by institutional
processes. Indeed, institutions create individualist discrimination in an im-
portant sense. I unpack the blurriness that actually categorizes the boundary
between these two modalities of discrimination in Part III. However, despite
the mutually constitutive nature of the two, scholars have tended to concep-
tualize them as strictly dichotomous—a circumstance that leads to the dis-
crimination-class schema and, ultimately, post-racial thinking.
A. Individualist Racial Discrimination
Scholars commonly understand individualist racial discrimination as
acts that individuals take that function to harm, stigmatize, or otherwise dis-
advantage a member of a racial group.  What makes it racial discrimination
is that the individual acts so as to injure the affected party because of the
affected party’s racial group membership.
Writing on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement, psychologist Joel
Kovel proposed a schema of individualist racial discrimination that has been
quite influential.68 Using the language of racism, he identified two types of
individualist racial discrimination: dominative racism and aversive racism.
Dominative racism is the species of racial discrimination that the average
person probably most associates with the term “racism.” It is characterized
by a belief in the superiority of the racial in-group and the inferiority of the
racial out-group.69 Dominative racists are expected to have feelings of ha-
tred, malice, and/or animus towards the targeted racial groups.70 They are
“bigots,” “segregationists,” and “white supremacists.” Race scholars some-
times refer to dominative racism as “traditional racism” because it is the
mechanism that perpetuated racial disadvantage in the decades and centuries
that preceded the modern civil rights era. Thus, when members of the Ku
Klux Klan burn crosses on the lawns of black families, when anti-Semites
deface synagogues by spray-painting them with swastikas, and when em-
ployers refuse to hire a qualified job candidate because she is Muslim,71
68 See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 3 (1970).
69 See id. at 32.
70 See id. at 189.
71 I have argued elsewhere that “Muslim” and “Jewish,” as well as “Mexican” and “Pu-
erto Rican” are racial categories—even though they do not comfortably fit within racial sche-
matizations that posit the existence of four or five races. See Bridges, Dangerous Law, supra
note 24, at 39–40. These schematizations would understand “Muslim” and “Mexican” to be R
“religions,” “ethnicities,” or “nationalities”—and not races. I reject these types of schemati-
zations because they are premised on scientifically discredited theories of biological race. Id.
at 29–36. Moreover, they obscure the work that categories like “Muslim” and “Mexican” do
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most people see old-school, individualist, dominative racism and the perpe-
trators of them as old-school racists.
Race scholars conceptualize aversive racism as the subtler, more mod-
ern cousin of dominative racism. As psychologists John Dovidio and Samuel
Gaertner, who have written extensively about the topic, explain, “[a]versive
racists . . . sympathize with victims of past injustice, support the principle of
racial equality, and regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but, at the same
time, possess negative feelings and beliefs about blacks, which may be un-
conscious.”72 The Implicit Association Test is probably the most widely rec-
ognized measure of aversive racism, or implicit bias.73 The test places users
under considerable time constraints and asks them to link images of black
and white faces with pleasant and unpleasant words. The test tends to show
that the association between white faces and pleasant words (and vice versa)
is much stronger than the association between black faces and pleasant
words (and vice versa).74 This is true even for test takers who disavow har-
boring any racial animus and who profess a commitment to the ideal of
racial equality.75
There is now a substantial literature documenting the phenomenon of
“implicit bias” or “unconscious racism.”76 This literature is comprised of
studies that reveal, for example, that people become much more frustrated
and hostile when they are asked to repeat a task after being flashed sublimi-
nally with the face of a black person, that people feel like the criminal justice
system should be much more punitive after being shown a crime story that
features the mugshot of a black person, and that people are much more likely
to shoot an unarmed black person than they are an unarmed white person
and are much more likely not to shoot an armed white person than they are
to order society and to distribute resources towards and away from certain groups—much like
the traditional racial categories of “black,” “white,” “Asian,” etc. Id. at 39–40.
72 John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2004).
73 See Preliminary Information for Taking an Implicit Association Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html [https://perma.cc/XBJ4-G4BX].
While recent studies documenting implicit bias tend to rely on cognitive science, one of the
first theorizations of implicit bias in legal scholarship relied instead on Freudian psychoana-
lytic theory. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987). Lawrence theorized that while the ego
accepted the post-civil rights era social norm of racial inequality, the id still harbored socially
unacceptable ideas about racial minorities. Id. at 335–36. Unconscious racism/implicit bias is
the product of the ego’s attempt to censor the id. Id.
74 Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and
Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 956–57 (2008).
75 Id. at 962.
76 Implicit bias does have its naysayers, though. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E.
Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L J. 1023 (ques-
tioning the validity of studies that purport to demonstrate the existence of implicit bias).
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not to shoot an armed black person.77 Legal scholars have written volumes
about what the existence of implicit bias should mean for the law.78
Of course, dominative racism and implicit bias do not constitute the
universe of individualist racial discrimination. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva, for one, has argued that we cannot properly categorize the ideology
that supports and justifies racial inequality in the present as either domina-
tive racism or a product of implicit bias.79 He writes that individualist racial
discrimination in its modern iteration “has rearticulated elements of tradi-
tional liberalism (work ethic, rewards by merit, equal opportunity, individu-
alism, etc.) for racially illiberal goals.”80 Thus, according to Bonilla-Silva,
modern-day discriminators do not necessarily hate people of color; that is,
they are not dominative racists. Neither are modern-day discriminators un-
conscious of their racial biases; that is, they do not have implicit biases.
Instead, they consciously believe racial minorities to be culturally inferior
(i.e., lazy, in possession of problematic values, work averse, inclined to
criminality).81 Accordingly, Bonilla-Silva offers a species of individualist ra-
cial discrimination that captures individuals’ beliefs in stereotypes about
77 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491–93 (2005)
(discussing these studies).
78 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1016 (1988); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 481 (2005); Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith, & Danielle M. Young,
Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six
Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U L. REV. 513 (2014); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff,
Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE. L.J. 2626 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein
& Christine Jolls, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
Notably, Justice Scalia once articulated his sense that the existence of implicit bias should
mean nothing for the law. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court declared the constitutionality of
the death penalty despite good statistical evidence that racial bias made it more likely that
black defendants would be sentenced to death. 481 U.S. 279, 279–82 (1987). The evidence
suggested that the biases that led juries to vote for the death penalty for black defendants—and
the biases that led prosecutors to seek the death penalty in the first instance—were implicit:
These actors likely were not aware of them. In response to this evidence, Justice Scalia wrote a
memo to his colleagues in which he stated that while implicit biases likely made the criminal
justice system a deadlier space for black people, this fact was insignificant to him:
I do not share the view, implicit in [the draft opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp], that an
effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could be shown by sufficiently strong
statistical evidence, would require reversal. . . . Since it is my view that the uncon-
scious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury
decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [decisions], is real, acknowledged [in the deci-
sions] of this court and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more
proof.
Memorandum to the Conference from J. Antonin Scalia in No. 84-6811—McClesky v. Kemp
(Jan. 6, 1987) (on file in the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in Den-
nis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights and Remedies from the Perspective
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1994).
79 See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 49, at 1–4.
80 Id. at 7.
81 Id. at 2.
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members of a racial out-group. That is, when individualist racial discrimina-
tion is conscious, it does not have to be the stuff of race-based animus; it can
simply be assumptions about the characteristics that members of racial out-
groups invariably or usually possess.
While dominative racism, implicit bias, and racial stereotypical think-
ing are probably the most widely-known iterations of individualist racial dis-
crimination, there are other iterations of individualist racial discrimination
that do not comfortably fit within these categories. For example, economist
Gary Becker has theorized that sometimes people discriminate because they
have a “taste” for it; they simply have a (likely irrational, but definitely
costly) desire to associate with or disassociate from a group and its mem-
bers.82 These individuals—who do not want to dominate members of the
racial out-group, do not believe in stereotypes about members of the racial
out-group, nor are unconscious of their racial biases—are still perpetrators
of individualist racial discrimination.
Other theorists have offered the concept of “statistical discrimination,”
which occurs when persons discriminate against an individual because he
belongs to a group that is statistically more likely to engage in a behavior or
to possess a characteristic that the decision-maker finds problematic.83 Pri-
vacy scholar Lior Strahilevitz helpfully provides the example of an employer
who is disinclined to hire ex-felons in a context in which black males are
disproportionately represented among the population of persons who have
been convicted of a felony.84 In an attempt to avoid hiring ex-felons, this
employer may engage in statistical discrimination against black males; that
is, he may not hire any individual black male candidate, as the candidate
belongs to a group that is statistically more likely to possess characteristics
(i.e., the status of being an ex-felon) that the employer finds problematic.85
Statistical discriminators, who rationally disadvantage persons on the basis
of their group membership, are still perpetrators of individualist racial
discrimination.
B. Institutional Racial Discrimination
Scholars credit political activist Stokely Carmichael and sociologist
Charles Hamilton with first using the term “institutional racism.”86 In their
1967 tome, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America, they distin-
82 GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 6 (1957).
83 Hanming Fang and Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative
Action: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS 133, 134–35 (Jess Benhabib, Matthew
O. Jackson, and Alberto Bisin eds., 2011).
84 Lior Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 366
(2008).
85 Id. at 365–66.
86 López, supra note 67, at 1826.
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guished individual acts of racism from a source of racial disadvantage that
was more covert and subtle, writing:
When white terrorists bomb a black church and kill five black chil-
dren, that is an act of individual racism, widely deplored by most
segments of the society. But when in that same city—Birming-
ham, Alabama—five hundred black babies die each year because
of the lack of proper food, shelter and medical facilities . . . . that
is a function of institutional racism.87
The term became popular over the course of the next several decades,
as it gestured to the processes that maintained racial inequality in the post-
civil rights era despite the seemingly obvious decline in individualist racial
discrimination.88 Although widely used, even those on the political left criti-
cized the concept as not being fully fleshed out and, therefore, lacking in
explanatory power. Indeed, early in the concept’s life, social theorists
“warned that the term ‘institutional racism’ would forever be a political slo-
gan lacking in analytical rigor until it could be more precisely conceptual-
ized, theorized, and subject to empirical investigation.”89
Interestingly, commentators have made a similar assessment of the con-
cept in more recent years, decades after it was first critiqued as being under-
theorized. More than thirty years after Carmichael90 and Hamilton coined the
term, critical race theorist Ian Haney López observed that “‘[i]nstitutional
racism’ seems to function more often as a label for a problem than as a
theory of social behavior. A theory of ‘institutional racism’ has been elu-
sive.”91 Scores of scholars have attempted to answer the call to define92 and
87 CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 4.
88 López, supra note 67, at 1726.
89 Coretta Phillips, Institutional Racism and Ethnic Inequalities: An Expanded Multilevel
Framework, 40 J. OF SOC. POL’Y 173, 173 (2011).
90 Carmichael later changed his name to Kwame Ture. See Stokely Carmichael: Biogra-
phy, http://www.biography.com/people/stokely-carmichael-9238629#joining-the-black-pan-
ther-party [https://perma.cc/Y3FE-LY54].
91 López, supra note 67, at 1726–27. He goes on to identify two possible definitions: “For
some, institutional racism amounts to intentional racism in institutions—that is, purposeful
discrimination in formally organized settings. For others, it refers to widespread race-neutral
practices that impose harmful effects on minority communities, irrespective of the actions or
attitudes of individual decision makers.” Id. at 1727.
92 See, e.g., Gee & Ford, supra note 67, at 117 (“Structural racism is defined as the
macrolevel systems, social forces, institutions, ideologies, and processes that interact with one
another to generate and reinforce inequities among racial and ethnic groups[.]”); Wiecek,
supra note 68, at 5 (“Structural racism is a complex, dynamic system of conferring social
benefits on some groups and imposing burdens on others that results in segregation, poverty,
and denial of opportunity for millions of people of color. It comprises cultural beliefs, histori-
cal legacies, and institutional policies within and among public and private organizations that
interweave to create drastic racial disparities in life outcomes.”).
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theorize93 institutional racism—or what this article calls “institutional racial
discrimination”—with precision.94
93 Theorizations of institutional racial discrimination tend to feature four elements. First,
most definitions include a lack of intentionality. That is, most scholars posit that the laws,
policies, procedures, and programs that function to produce racial inequality—specifically, a
racial hierarchy in which white people, as a group, are doing much better than most minority
groups—do not have racial subordination as their purpose or design. See, e.g., john a. powell,
Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 79495
(2008) (stating that “racism need not be . . . intentional,” but noting the foreseeability of
unintended racial harms). Second, most definitions include an element of banality. That is, the
practices that sustain racial inequality are not spectacular. Quite the contrary, they are every-
day, prosaic, mundane, ordinary. See, e.g., Doane, What is Racism? Racial Discourse and
Racial Politics, 32 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 255, 267–68 (2006) (describing “structural or sys-
temic racism” as a concept that understands “racial inequality [to be] a pervasive aspect of
everyday life and the normal functioning of institutions”) (emphases added). Third, most defi-
nitions include an element of race neutrality—the absence of any explicit invocation of race.
The idea is that the things that sustain racial inequality are myriad, and the most consequential
of them reproduce racial hierarchies without mentioning race at all. See, e.g., López, supra
note 67, at 1730 (“Racism occurs frequently—and perhaps predominately without any specific
invocation of race[.]”).  Fourth and finally, most definitions note the irrelevance of the “bad
actor.” That is, there is no evil “man behind the curtain” designing and operating the institu-
tions that form the stuff of institutional racial discrimination. According to most definitions,
actors—be they good, bad, or indifferent—are irrelevant in the grand scheme of things, as they
play a minuscule role in something that is much bigger than themselves. See, e.g., Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1841, 1852 (1994) (“[E]ven in the absence of racism, race-neutral policy could be
expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification in a society with a history
of racism . . . . There is no racist actor or racist policy in this model, and yet a racially stratified
society is the inevitable result.”); López, supra note 16, at 1040 (noting that some theories of
institutional racial discrimination “lack not only intent, but even actors”).
94 There remains the question of whether institutional racial discrimination is a synonym
for structural racial discrimination, or whether the terms refer to two different phenomena.
While most theorists conceptualize the two as synonymous, some differentiate “institutions”
and “structures,” and thus differentiate institutional racial discrimination and structural racial
discrimination. For example, race theorist john powell contends that the term “institutional
racism” focuses on “intrainstitutional dynamics,” referring to the “practices and procedures
within an institution” that may have the unintended consequence of disadvantaging racial mi-
norities as a group. powell, supra note 93, at 795–96. He theorizes that the concept of “struc- R
tural racism” is different, referring to the way that several institutions “interact to produce
racialized outcomes.” Id. at 793. Thus, within powell’s schema, a theorist concerned with
identifying and dismantling “institutional racism” will be looking within a single, isolated
institution for those programs that function to reproduce racial hierarchies. Meanwhile, a theo-
rist concerned with identifying and dismantling “structural racism” will be observing how the
practices of multiple institutions, operating within multiple fields, combine in such a way that
racial minorities, as a group, are sustained in a subordinate social position. While the goal of
powell’s intervention is to encourage theorists to engage in more systemic, wide-ranging,
sweeping analyses of racial discrimination, that work has been done under the banner of “in-
stitutional racism” as often as it often as it has been done under the “structural racism” ban-
ner. Consequently, today, most theorists thinking about race consider the two terms to be
interchangeable. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, “The More Things Change. . .”: New Moves for
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2096
(2016) (using “structural racism” and “institutional racism” interchangeably); Meera E. Deo,
The Ugly Truth about Legal Academia, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 943, 951–52 (2015) (“What social
scientists call ‘structural racism’ and legal academics call ‘institutional racism’ largely refer to
the same ‘complex, dynamic system of conferring social benefits on some groups and impos-
ing burdens on others that results in . . . denial of opportunity for millions of people of
color.’”).
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Perhaps the biggest controversy around the concept of institutional ra-
cial discrimination pertains not to its definition or its contours, but rather to
its existence. Many persons—especially those on the political right—are
skeptical that there is such a thing called institutional racial discrimination
and, if it exists, whether it explains as many social outcomes as progressive
race scholars and other sympathizers on the political left believe. For exam-
ple, in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Thomas did more than rail
against race-conscious admissions policies, those who have been admitted
pursuant to race-based affirmative action programs, and elitism within legal
academia; he also expressed his disapproval of the concept of “institutional
racism.”95 Thomas theorized that the admissions plan at issue in the case
“nearly guaranteed” that black applicants with less than stellar LSAT scores
would be admitted to the University of Michigan Law School.96 He conjec-
tured that the plan disincentivized black students from studying vigorously
for the LSAT.97 He suggested that maybe such disincentives were the real
reason why black people, as a group, do not perform as well as white people
on the LSAT and other standardized tests.98 He then acknowledged the spec-
ulative nature of his claim and, in the process, took a jab at the concept of
“institutional racism”:
It is far from certain that the LSAT test-taker’s behavior is respon-
sive to the Law School’s admissions policies. Nevertheless, the
possibility remains that this racial discrimination [in the form of
race-conscious admissions programs] will help fulfill the bigot’s
prophecy about black underperformance—just as it confirms the
conspiracy theorist’s belief that “institutional racism” is at fault for
every racial disparity in our society.99
To Thomas and like-minded persons, institutional racial discrimination
is the stuff of conspiracy theory. Believing that it explains present-day racial
stratification is akin to believing that the moon landing was staged in a
Hollywood movie lot,100 or that Tupac is alive and well and living in Cuba.101
However, while it may take an irrational level of skepticism to believe that
Neil Armstrong actually was in Los Angeles instead of on the moon in July
1969, and that Tupac Shakur miraculously dodged the hail of bullets that
95 539 U.S. 306, 349–78 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).




100 See, e.g., Ker Than, Photos: 8 Moon-Landing Hoax Myths – Busted, NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/07/photogalleries/apollo-moon-land-
ing-hoax-pictures/ [http://perma.cc/55AS-Q9WM] (noting that “[f]orty years after U.S.
astronaut Neil Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the moon, many conspiracy
theorists still insist the Apollo 11 moon landing was an elaborate hoax”).
101 Maryse Farag, WTF? Tupac Shakur Has Been Spotted Alive and Living in Cuba, SUN,
https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/202716/wtf-tupac-shakur-has-been-spotted-alive-and-
living-in-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/JJ45-627B].
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reportedly killed him in September 1996, it does not take an irresponsible
level of naiveté to believe that ostensibly race-neutral policies operate so as
to make black people and other racial minorities poorer, sicker, more incar-
cerated, more racially isolated, and less politically represented than their
white counterparts. Indeed, scholars have identified numerous institutional
mechanisms that produce and reproduce our existing racial hierarchies.102
Indeed, it is hard to dispute that many of the policies and practices that
race scholars have identified as “institutional racism” do, in fact, disadvan-
tage racial minorities. For example, few would deny that the funding of pub-
lic schools through property taxes disadvantages racial minorities who, as a
group, live in neighborhoods that are poorer and, consequently, have less to
offer in property taxes than their white counterparts.103 However, the disa-
greement might lie in whether it is appropriate to identify this funding struc-
ture as an example of racial discrimination.
C. The Discrimination-Class Schema: Different Strokes (of
Discrimination) for Different Folks
An analysis of the literature reveals that the racial discrimination binary
is part of a more elaborate schema of racial disenfranchisement, with differ-
ent groups of racial minorities imagined to be affected by different forms of
racial discrimination. To be precise, scholars tend to imagine that poor peo-
ple of color, specifically poor black people, are largely victims of institu-
tional racial discrimination; thinkers propose that macro processes of racial
disenfranchisement best explain this group’s marginalization.104 On the other
102 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Pellar & Kendall Thomas, Introduc-
tion to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxix
(1996) (noting that present-day ideas about what constitutes “merit”—defined as a resume
that features high standardized test scores, high grades, and extracurricular and volunteer activ-
ities—is “a mechanism for perpetuating the distribution of rights, privileges, and opportunity”
that benefits white people to the detriment of black people); Wiecek, supra note 67, at 5
(identifying as institutional racial discrimination the exclusion of agricultural and domestic
workers—groups that included most black laborers—from the class of workers eligible for
Social Security benefits in 1935, thereby eliminating black people “from even the most modest
opportunity that whites enjoyed for wealth accumulation and survival assistance in economic
downturns”).
103 See Pager & Shepherd, supra note 57, at 198 (noting that public schools are subject to
funding disparities because they are funded with property taxes, which produces the circum-
stance that “the broader resources of schools in poor neighborhoods are substantially
limited”).
104 It is worth reiterating that one can only believe that macro processes of racial disen-
franchisement explain the marginalization of poor people of color, and poor people more gen-
erally, when one rejects individualist explanations of poverty. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE
POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 35–36 (2017) (explaining that individualist explanations of pov-
erty embrace the idea that “people are poor because there is something wrong with them,” i.e.,
they are work averse, irresponsible, criminally inclined, promiscuous, unable to delay gratifi-
cation). Significantly, a majority of Americans presently embrace these explanations of pov-
erty over more structuralist ones. Id. at 43–44 (discussing the “substantial literature
documenting that the most favored explanation of poverty in the United States is one that
identifies individual behaviors as the root of indigence”).
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hand, scholars tend to imagine that wealthier people of color, for the most
part, have escaped the macro processes of racial disenfranchisement that
have ensnared their poorer counterparts. This results in the belief, even in
politically liberal circles, that wealthier people of color are not affected by
racial discrimination, or, if affected, it is by relatively insignificant individ-
ual acts of racial discrimination.
Now, this is not to argue that we have come to conceptualize poor peo-
ple of color as never being affected by individualist racial discrimination and
wealthier people of color as never being affected by institutional racial dis-
crimination. Quite the contrary, we do appreciate that the different modali-
ties of racial discrimination affect both the poor and their more affluent
counterparts. However, we do not believe that they affect the poor and the
more affluent equally. Instead, we have come to conceptualize institutional
racial discrimination as predominately affecting poor people of color; that is,
we have come to believe that their spectacular deprivation is the result of
institutional discriminatory processes—not individual encounters with dis-
crimination. Meanwhile, we have come to conceptualize the racial discrimi-
nation that wealthier people of color encounter—when they encounter it—as
usually of the individualist variety. The discrimination-class schema maps
our tendency to explain the poor’s marginalization largely in terms of institu-
tional racial discrimination and the more affluent’s marginalization largely in
terms of individualist racial discrimination.
1. Wealthier Racial Minorities as Victims of Individualist Racial
Discrimination
When scholars and other commentators conceptualize racial discrimina-
tion as affecting and disadvantaging wealthier racial minorities, they are usu-
ally talking about individualist racial discrimination. The book, Living with
Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience, is representative of this phe-
nomenon.105 Its authors, Joe Feagin and Melvin Sikes, offer the book as a
response to Wilson’s claim in 1978 that race had been declining in signifi-
cance.106 Feagin and Sikes counter with the position that not only does race
continue to be significant for the black middle class, but racial discrimina-
tion remains significant to this class-privileged group.107 However, they use
examples of individualist racial discrimination as proof of their claim. In-
deed, the book brims with stories about class-privileged black people’s en-
counters with “old-school,” dominative racism. Interlocutors tell stories of
being refused service at hotels and restaurants;108 of being followed around
105 FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 17.
106 See infra notes 108–115 and accompanying text.
107 See FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 17, at 15–18 (discussing “racism as an everyday
experience” for the black middle class).
108 Id. at 39–40.
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in stores;109 of being called racial slurs and threatened with physical vio-
lence;110 of being told that they were unqualified and that they were admitted
to competitive colleges only due to affirmative action.111 Indeed, the book
even contains a story about a man whose family was subjected to harassment
by a member of the Ku Klux Klan112—the classic symbol of dominative,
individualist racism. Further, for Feagin and Sikes, the solution to the contin-
uing significance of race to the black middle class is not institutional trans-
formation, as structures and institutions are not implicated in the type of
racial discrimination that they identify as affecting the middle class. Instead,
Feagin and Sikes argue that the solution lies in changing the hearts and
minds of white people, who are responsible for perpetrating, or remaining
indifferent to, individualist racial discrimination:
Until whites recognize that they have been raised in a racist soci-
ety and harbor its hidden influence even when they deny it, until
whites recognize that they too must take action to deal with per-
sonal and societal racism, no matter how subtle, and to eradicate it,
the racial situation in the United States will only worsen.113
This is to say that Feagin and Sikes offer individualist racial discrimination
as the discrimination that affects wealthier black people. Indeed, one is hard
pressed to conceptualize any of the narratives of racial subordination con-
tained in the book as stories of institutional discrimination.114
One can also witness in the debates over race-based affirmative action
the conceptualization of individualist racial discrimination as the discrimina-
tion that primarily affects racial minorities with class privilege when they
encounter race-based disadvantages. In response to the claim that middle-
class racial minorities are race-based affirmative action’s primary benefi-
ciaries and do not deserve such “preferences,” supporters of these programs
often respond by pointing out that the class privilege that wealthier people of
109 Id. at 43–44.
110 Id. at 50–61.
111 Id. at 114.
112 Id. at 261.
113 Id. at 321.
114 Quite telling is Feagin and Sikes’s discussion of residential segregation. They offer
individualist racial discrimination as the explanation for residential segregation, noting that a
survey showed that 40% of white people expressed approval of a law that gave homeowners
the right not to sell their homes to black people and observing that audit studies have docu-
mented that black people seeking apartments to rent and to buy are shown fewer units and
steered towards different neighborhoods than white people with the same backgrounds. See
FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 17, at 22–28. These are acts of individualist racial discrimination.
However, high levels of residential segregation, and the fact that black people with high in-
comes do not live in houses and neighborhoods that are comparable to those in which white
people with the same incomes live, can be, and ought to be, explained in structural terms. See,
e.g., ROITHMAYR, supra note 43, at 58 (stating that people of color have less wealth than white
people—even when one controls for income—because of disadvantages that have been locked
into the economy and, consequently, black people are less able to accumulate comparable
wealth-generating assets, such as houses).
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color enjoy does not eliminate all of their race-based disadvantages.115 They
argue that, like their poorer brethren, middle-class racial minorities also ex-
perience racial discrimination. Yet, the evidence that they invariably offer is
acts of individualist racial discrimination.
Consider Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action,116 in which the Court held that an amendment to a state
constitution prohibiting race-consciousness in university admissions did not
disturb the Equal Protection Clause. Sotomayor articulated her sense that a
post-racial belief that race generally does not matter motivated the majority’s
decision to uphold the amendment. She disagreed, arguing that race matters
because of the “persistent racial inequality in society—inequality that can-
not be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities.”117
Here, essentially, Sotomayor can be heard to argue that race matters because
racial discrimination has produced racial minorities as disproportionately
poor.
But she goes on. And, in light of the criticism that race-based affirma-
tive action only benefits class-privileged racial minorities—a criticism that
some of her brethren on the Court have made118—her next comments ad-
dress the significance of race to those racial minorities who are not poor. She
writes:
Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends his
teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the
neighborhood where he grew up. Race matters to a young wo-
man’s sense of self when she states her hometown, and then is
pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, regardless of how
many generations her family has been in the country. Race matters
to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language,
which he does not understand because only English was spoken at
home. Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I do not
belong here.”119
Here, Sotomayor cites several instances of racial marginalization that
wealthier racial minorities are just as likely to experience as their poorer
counterparts. But each instance is an individual act of racial discrimination.
Thus, Sotomayor can be heard to argue that, in keeping with the understand-
ing that individualist racial discrimination is typically the modality of race-
115 See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 56 (2012) (“Affirmative action’s defenders often respond by
pointing out the various ways in which even privileged blacks suffer racial discrimination.”).
116 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
117 See id. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118 See discussion of Scalia’s and Thomas’s opposition to race-based affirmative action,
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
119 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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based disadvantage that wealthier racial minorities encounter whenever the
come across such disadvantage, race matters because individual acts of ra-
cial discrimination injure those racial minorities who have managed to es-
cape the structural forces that subordinate their poor counterparts.
Indeed, in my own defenses of race-based affirmative action, I have
made the same rhetorical moves that Sotomayor makes in Schuette: I have
cited individualist racial discrimination as evidence of the significance of
race to all racial minorities, including those with class privilege.120 Riffing
off of Sotomayor’s defense of affirmative action in Schuette, I wrote:
Race matters when a black woman is not assumed to be the owner
of the home in front of which she stands. Race matters when a
Latina’s doctor offers her a long-acting contraceptive injection
while this same doctor offers her counterpart with race privilege a
simple birth control pill. Race matters even in hackneyed ways—
when a black man finds it impossible to hail a cab in any major
metropolitan city. It matters when police stop a black or Latino
man while letting white men pass undisturbed. It is undeniable that
class privilege ameliorates some of the effects that the lack of race
privilege would otherwise produce. But, it should also be undenia-
ble that even those racial minorities with class privilege have had
the hurtful experiences described here. Race matters irrespective
of class.121
All of the instances that I offer as evidence of the significance of race to
wealthier racial minorities are acts of individualist racial discrimination.
This phenomenon—where examples of individualist discrimination are
used to demonstrate the existence of racial subordination for wealthier peo-
ple of color—is not limited to the affirmative action context. It happens in
the criminal justice context as well. Many scholars have argued that racial
profiling—and the fact that the practice is an indignity that communicates
the profiled person’s outsider status—is something endured by people of
color of all socioeconomic statuses. In his exposition on the significance of
the racial profiling of motorists, a practice that has been dubbed “driving
while black,” legal scholar David Harris interviewed class-privileged black
people and asked them to recount their experiences with being stopped by
the police.122 He explained that his choice to interview black people who
were not poor was intentional, as focusing on those with some privilege
demonstrates that “‘driving while black’ is not only an experience of the
young black male, or those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. All
blacks confront the issue directly, regardless of age, dress, occupation, or
120 See Bridges, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 12.
121 Id. at 92–93.
122 David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black”
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999).
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social station.”123 Thus, Harris essentially argues, “Wealthier black people
are affected by racial discrimination, too!” And the practice that he offers to
demonstrate his claim is racial profiling, a practice that best fits on the indi-
vidualist side of the discrimination binary.124
One can also find in the public health literature arguments about the
impact of individualist racial discrimination on wealthier people of color. As
noted above, racial disparities in health are well-documented.125 Moreover,
black people have increased levels of morbidity and mortality compared to
white people across income levels.126 That is, even wealthier people of color
are being affected by processes and/or practices that limit the quality and
length of their lives. Recent scholarship has attempted to explain racial dis-
parities in health among the wealthy. And, as we might expect given the
discrimination-class schema that this Part has identified and outlined, these
recent explanations detect individualist racial discrimination as the culprit.127
As physician Jack Geiger writes, “[R]acial and ethnic discrimination itself
may be an important contributor to health disparities, not merely through the
historic and persistent disadvantages it creates for minorities in the Ameri-
can social structure, but also specifically through health provider bias—con-
scious or unconscious. . .”128 Thus, Geiger can be heard to argue that while
123 Id. at 269–70 n.18.
124 Actually, there may be reasonable disagreement about whether racial profiling by law
enforcement is best understood as a species of individual racial discrimination or institutional
racial discrimination. While individual police officers engage in the practice, there may be
institutional elements to it as well. For example, it may not be individual police officers who
engage in the practice so much as police departments. If so, then the practice seems more like
one that is perpetrated by institutions rather than individuals. Further, there is the fact that the
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause to permit racial
profiling. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  Thus, when one views the practice
within the context of the Constitution, one sees that individuals engage in the practice only
because larger structural forces allow it. This fact may lead to the conclusion that racial profil-
ing by law enforcement is better conceptualized as an instance of institutional racial
discrimination.
125 See supra notes 22, 27, 28, 30 and accompanying text.
126 See WILSON, supra note 13, at 188 (noting that black people “at all levels of income
have lower life expectancy and higher levels of mortality than comparable whites”).
127 Some explanations of why racial disparities in health persist across the socioeconomic
spectrum look to the imagined biological/genetic differences between the races. See H. Jack
Geiger, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Diagnosis and Treatment: A Review of the Evidence
and a Consideration of Causes, in UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 31, at 418 (noting that
some studies have explained racial disparities in health with the idea that “there are biologi-
cally and genetically distinct human races, and that ‘racial’ biologic differences in susceptibil-
ity to, manifestations of, or therapeutic responses to specific diseases are significant
pathophysiologic contributors to health disparities”). However, good science has debunked the
idea that racial disparities reflect biological/genetic differences, as the idea is premised on the
fallacy that racial groups represent populations of genetically similar individuals. See Bridges,
Dangerous Law, supra note 24, at 28–36 (discussing the idea of biological race and the wealth
of studies disproving its existence).
128 Geiger, supra note 127, at 418. If we can explain racial disparities in health among
those with class privilege in terms of individual bias, the bias may involve thinking of and
treating racial minorities with class privilege as indistinguishable from racial minorities with-
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structural racial discrimination has decreased the quality and length of life of
poor people of color, individualist racial discrimination has done the same to
wealthy people of color. The discrimination-class schema is readily
apparent.
Other explanations of racial disparities in health across income levels
similarly look to the effects of individualist racial discrimination on wealth-
ier people of color. However, these alternative explanations subordinate the
significance of provider bias to the significance of a life filled with en-
counters with individualist racial discrimination. For example, pediatrics
professor J.W. Collins notes that racial disparities in infant mortality rates
persist across class.129 He then attributes elevated rates of infant morbidity
among wealthier women of color to “interpersonal racial discrimination.”130
That is, the wealthier black women living in high-income Chicago neighbor-
hoods whom he studied counted mostly white people among their neigh-
bors.131 He conjectures that daily interaction with white people acted as a
stressor on the black women studied, thereby increasing their likelihood of
giving birth to a preterm infant.132 In essence, Collins offers that—in keeping
with the discrimination-class schema—wealthier people of color are encoun-
tering individualist racial discrimination, and it is shortening their lives.
2. Poor Racial Minorities as Victims of Institutional Racial
Discrimination
Accounts of institutional racial discrimination seem to suggest that it is
primarily poor racial minorities who are its victims. Such accounts suggest
that wealthier racial minorities have managed to escape these large-scale
processes unscathed.
Consider sociologist William Julius Wilson’s highly influential, and su-
premely controversial, analysis of the shift that has occurred in the mecha-
nisms that sustain racial hierarchies.133 In The Declining Significance of
Race, Wilson made the case that, while black people, as a group, had been
subordinated by explicitly race-based policies and practices in the pre-civil
rights era, this was not true in contemporary times.134 Instead, class-based
processes now produced black people’s subordinated social position.135
out class privilege. See id. at 443 (describing a clinician who said that race is used in the
clinical encounter because it is understood as being “a proxy for socioeconomic status”).
129 See Collins, supra note 27, at 113.
130 Id. at 116.
131 Id.
132 See id. (“An expanding literature provides evidence that African American women’s
lifetime exposure to interpersonal racial discrimination is a strong independent risk factor for
[having a baby with very low birth weight]. We previously found that the association is
strongest among college-educated women, a subgroup most likely to have a lifelong residence
in high-income neighborhoods.”).
133 See WILSON, supra note 13.
134 Id. at 1–2.
135 Id.
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Hence the title of the book: race was no longer as significant as it had been
in years past in explaining racial stratification. Class now had greater ex-
planatory power.
Wilson argues that structural transformations in the economy—the ad-
vent of “labor-saving innovations, relocation of industry, labor market seg-
mentation, and the shift from goods-producing to service-producing
industries”—are responsible for the present-day subordination of black peo-
ple.136 While these structural shifts have devastated the black poor, Wilson
describes the black middle class as having escaped them entirely. Indeed,
Wilson describes the black poor as languishing under the weight of these
large-scale dislocations while the black middle class thrives.137 Thus, if we
identify as institutional racial discrimination these dislocations and the con-
comitant refusal by society to redistribute the burdens that they have pro-
duced,138 then we can only fairly identify the black poor as its victims.
136 Id. at 165.
137 See id. at 22 (“As the black middle class rides on the wave of political and social
changes, benefitting from the growth of employment opportunities in the growing corporate
and government sectors of the economy, the black underclass falls behind the larger society in
every conceivable respect.”).
In subsequent decades, Wilson realized that his portrait of the black middle class had been
too sanguine, and he endeavored to qualify his assessment of the group by indicating the
contingent nature of its successes. See id. at 192 (“[I]f I were writing The Declining Signifi-
cance of Race today, I would . . . underline the role and importance of affirmative action
programs. . . . I would discuss the impact of a possible contraction in government employment
as well as waning public support for affirmative action on the occupational mobility of the
more advantaged and educated African Americans.”).
138 Of course, the million-dollar question may be whether we should understand these
structural transformations as a species of institutional racial discrimination. Many would an-
swer in the affirmative, arguing that “racial discrimination” aptly describes society’s compla-
cency with allowing black people and other racial minorities to bear the brunt of these macro
changes in the economy, the lack of political will to reallocate resources to make these struc-
tural dislocations less harshly felt by communities of color, and the general willingness to
attribute responsibility for poverty to those people of color who are being made to live the
indigence that these structural dislocations create. See Crenshaw, et al., supra note 102, at xxx
(“The particularities of race and its persistent presence as an explicit rationalization of struc-
tural stratification in the current economy seem hardly to warrant discussion. One would think
that the racial composition of the communities which have been chosen to bear the sharp edge
of economic dislocation is altogether irrelevant.  However, even a cursory review of current
national discourses about public education, unemployment, education, immigration, and wel-
fare reform (to take a few examples) demonstrates the degree to which questions of race and
racial ideology stand at the very center of today’s debates.”).
Interestingly, it is unlikely that Wilson himself would identify the structural transformations
that he describes and the policy choices that we have made (or have failed to make) in re-
sponse to them as a species of racial discrimination. He seems to embrace a definition of racial
discrimination that only includes race-based animus and hatred—dominative racism. In a re-
flection on The Declining Significance of Race, written some forty years after its initial publi-
cation, Wilson writes, “Race is still a very important factor in American society not only
because of lingering racism, despite Obama’s election, but also because a disproportionate
number of people of color concentrated at the very bottom of the economic ladder symbolizes
the persistence of racial inequality in the United States.” WILSON, supra note 13, at 184. For
Wilson, “racism” lingers; but it is something that is altogether distinct from the disproportion-
ate number of black people among the poor. The latter reveals “racial inequality.” But it is not
“racism.”
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Meanwhile, the black middle class remains untouched, having evaded the
ravages of institutional racial discrimination.139
More recent investigations are apiece with Wilson’s analysis insofar as
they identify the black poor as subordinated by institutional mechanisms
while suggesting that the black middle class has escaped these processes.
Consider legal scholar James Forman’s work on mass incarceration.140 He has
argued that framing the incarceration of a devastatingly high number of
black people as a “New Jim Crow,” an analogy that was popularized by
Michelle Alexander’s bestselling book,141 is inappropriate because it does not
accurately capture the fact that wealthier people of color are not as vulnera-
ble to the criminal justice system as are poor people of color. Whereas the
“old” Jim Crow universally subordinated black people, rich and poor alike,
mass incarceration today does not. He writes:
[I]ncreased income and educational attainment can bring a mea-
sure of protection against some of the criminal justice system’s
historic anti-black tendencies. Accordingly, in considering mass
incarceration, any suggestion that blacks across classes are simi-
larly situated in the face of American racism should be aban-
doned. . . . [Critical race theorist Mari] Matsuda pointed out that
Japanese Americans across classes all shared a similar fate in in-
ternment camps during World War II. But prisons . . . are precisely
the opposite of internment camps in this regard.142
Essentially, Forman can be read to argue that, if the mass incarceration
of black males that we witness today is the consequence of institutional ra-
cial discrimination in the criminal justice system, then it is an institutional
racial discrimination that has predominately impacted poor black people.
Wealthier black people’s incomes allow them to avoid the “anti-black ten-
dencies” of zero tolerance policies in public schools,143 the “war on
drugs,”144 the heavy police presence in poor communities,145 stop-and-
frisk,146 underfunded and overburdened public defender offices,147 mandatory
139 See also Read & Emerson, supra note 36, at 183 (arguing that “[r]acism, especially at
the institutional level, is . . . the key mechanism through which race operates to perpetuate
differences in socioeconomic status”).
140 See Forman, supra note 115.
141 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
142 See Forman, supra note 115, at 57.
143 Russell J. Skiba & Kimberly Knesting, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of
School Disciplinary Practice, 92 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 17 (2001).
144 LEIF ROSENBERGER, AMERICA’S DRUG WAR DEBACLE 31 (1996).
145 Arthur L. Burnett, Race and National Origin As Influential Factors in Juvenile Deten-
tion, 3 D.C. L. REV. 355, 356 (1995).
146 Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop and Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs Linger,
But How Far Can the Police Go?, 72-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 42 (2000).
147 Heather Perry Baxter, At a Crossroads: Where the Indigent Defense Crisis and the
Legal Education Crisis Intersect, 18 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 25, 27 (2016).
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sentencing,148 etc. Poor black people are the victims of these practices and
programs that, together, comprise institutional racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system. Class-privileged black people, on the other hand, are
thought to have gone unaffected by this form of discrimination for the most
part. Now, this is not to say that we, as a society, do not recognize those
occasions when class-privileged people of color are burdened by the crimi-
nal justice system. For example, we certainly took notice when a white po-
lice officer arrested distinguished black Harvard professor, Henry Louis
Gates, inside of his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts.149 However, when
class-privileged people of color find themselves encumbered by the criminal
justice system, the tendency usually is to explain those events as an instance
of a wealthier person of color getting swept up in the institutional processes
that are designed for his poorer brethren. Or, in keeping with the racial-
discrimination schema, we explain those events in terms of individualist ra-
cial discrimination. Indeed, after Gates’s arrest, then-President Obama in-
vited Gates and the officer who arrested him, Sergeant James Crowley, to
the White House for a “Beer Summit,” suggesting that Gates’s arrest was
nothing more than a conflict between two individuals that could be resolved
over some ice-cold brews.150
Scholars have also been willing to identify as institutional racial dis-
crimination the failure of the Court to hold that poor people are a suspect
class and/or that classifications on the basis of wealth are suspect.151 They
148 Jeff Lazarus, Making the Fair Sentencing Act Retroactive: Just Think of the Savings . . .
Clause, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 713, 714 (2013).
149 How One Scholar’s Arrest Tainted the President’s Image as a Racial Healer, WASH.
POST, (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/
henry-louis-gates-jr-arrest-controversy.html [https://perma.cc/R3SF-J24V].
150 Id. Of course, Gates’s arrest ought not to be explained in terms of Crowley’s (good or
bad) judgment or personally-held beliefs about race. Gates’s arrest, as well as most of the
racialized encounters that class-privileged people of color have with the police and the crimi-
nal justice system, ought to be explained in institutional terms. As Capers explains, police
officers often stop and frisk individuals when they appear not to “belong” in a neighborhood.
See Capers, supra note 41. Thus, when black persons are in largely white areas, it produces a
racial incongruity that may arouse a police officer’s suspicions and lead to an encounter. Im-
portantly, institutional and structural forces combine to produce areas as “largely white.” In-
deed, institutional racial discrimination produces the ubiquitous artifact that we call a “white
neighborhood” (as well as the “black neighborhood,” the “Mexican neighborhood,” and so
on). Thus, if Gates aroused the suspicion of the police (or his neighbor, who called the police
because he thought that Gates might have been trying to break into his own home), it was
because, as a black man in a white neighborhood, he looked “out of place.” Institutional
processes create the circumstance whereby individuals can appear to be “out of place.”
This simply goes to show that the line between institutional racial discrimination and indi-
vidual racial discrimination is a blurry one, with institutional processes reinforcing and making
possible individual actions. I unpack the co-constitutive nature of institutional and individual
racial discrimination in infra Part IV.
151 See, e.g., Margalynne Armstrong, Privilege in Residential Housing, in PRIVILEGE RE-
VEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 43, 53 (Stephanie M. Wildman
ed., 1996) (“Most frequently, courts protect the ‘right’ to engage in racial discrimination as an
unspoken corollary of the right to discriminate on the basis of income.”); Audrey G. McFar-
lane, Operatively White? Exploring the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox
of Black Middle-Classness, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 163, 163 (2009) (“[S]ociety’s unexam-
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have noted that, in light of the fact that people of color disproportionately
bear the burdens of indigence in this country, discrimination on the basis of
income or wealth is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of race.152
Thus, the Court’s refusal to give heightened judicial scrutiny to laws that
have either the purpose or effect of burdening the poor essentially licenses
discrimination against people of color.153 Scholars have argued that this is a
form of institutional racial discrimination.154 Moreover, it is a form of insti-
tutional racial discrimination that only affects poor people of color. Wealth-
ier people of color, by definition, are able to escape this race-neutral
mechanism of racial subordination, as their class privilege means that they
are burdened neither by laws that discriminate against the poor nor a juris-
prudence that allows it.
It might be worth noting that those with liberal politics are not the only
persons who are open to conceptualizing institutional racial discrimination
as affecting, and marginalizing, poor people of color. Every so often one
hears someone on the political right articulate this sense. An intriguing in-
stance of this phenomenon occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
and its devastation of the Gulf Coast. Then President George W. Bush spoke
about the “deep, persistent poverty” that “all of us saw on television.”155 He
went on to explain that this deep, persistent poverty “has roots in a history of
racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity of
America.”156 In essence, Bush argued that those indigent black people who
had experienced the trauma and devastation of being trapped in New Orleans
after the levees broke were poor because processes that originated in “racial
discrimination” had made it impossible for them to attempt to free them-
selves of poverty. Thus, Bush offered a fairly robust definition of institu-
tional racial discrimination and pointed to a population of poor people of
color as having been affected by it.
ined embrace of class discrimination reflects the irony that class is both the preferred method
for and the hidden obstacle to racial justice.”). For a discussion of what is at stake in a holding
that the poor is a suspect class, see Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 20–21 (1969) (arguing that the
Court ought to find that the poor are a suspect class and, consequently, use strict scrutiny to
review laws that burden them).
152 John O. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the
Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REV. 201, 235 (1982) (“Although in absolute numbers there are more
white poor than Black poor, Blacks carry a disproportionate burden of poverty, and thus many
times their claims for substantive distributive justice are essentially race claims.”).
153 See Armstrong, supra note 151, at 54 (“When our courts refuse to recognize economic
class as a suspect category they protect legally prohibited racial discrimination, allowing those
who discriminate to frustrate civil rights goals.”).
154 See id.
155 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views
of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 405 (2008) (quoting Press
Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Ad-
dress to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2005)).
156 Id.
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3. Attestations of the Relative Insignificance of Individualist Racial
Discrimination
How do the racial discrimination binary and the discrimination-class
schema outlined above—wherein scholars conceptualize institutional racial
discrimination as largely affecting poor people of color and imagine wealth-
ier people of color to be primarily affected by individualist racial discrimina-
tion—contribute to the invisibility of the racial subordination of class-
privileged racial minorities? The answer is quite simple: While theorists and
observers were (inadvertently) constructing the conceptual schema wherein
institutional discrimination largely affects poor people of color and wealthier
people of color primarily encounter individualist discrimination whenever
they do encounter discrimination, progressive thinkers of race simultane-
ously were arguing that, in the post-civil rights era, individualist discrimina-
tion is not nearly as important as institutional discrimination in determining
individuals’ life chances.  Now, race scholars have never argued that individ-
ualist racial discrimination no longer exists.157 Rather, their argument has
been that, when we shape our current definitions of racial discrimination on
the model of individualist discrimination, we miss the macro, large-scale
processes that do most of the work in the present of creating and maintaining
the racial hierarchies that stratify our society.158 Their argument has been that
when we go searching for individualist discrimination, we overlook the prac-
157 See, e.g., BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 79, at 19 (“Although I hold that the dominant
form of racism now practiced is a subtle one, this does not mean I am blind to the vulgar
explicit racism now in vogue among the ‘Tea Party’ and others on the right. Racial regimes
may change, but that transformation is never complete and remnants of the old-fashioned Jim
Crow racism are clearly resurgent. This resurgence is important and clearly influences the life
chances of people of color.”).
Roithmayr’s work is an instructive metaphor for the approach that progressive thinkers of
race have taken to the question of individualist racial discrimination. She begins by noting that
research has demonstrated that “racial bias (at least the conscious kind)” has decreased sub-
stantially since the days that preceded the civil rights era. ROITHMAYR, supra note 43, at 18.
She then asks, “In light of that research, could continuing discrimination [of this variety]
really explain the kinds of persistent racial gaps that we still see?” Id. She answers, “Possi-
bly.” Id. She then discusses the numerous auditor studies that have shown that jobseekers and
house- and apartment-hunters are disadvantaged by having “black-sounding,” as opposed to
“white-sounding,” names. Id. at 18–19. Although Roithmayr flags the “possible” importance
of individualist racial discrimination, the balance of the book is about institutional racial dis-
crimination and what must be done to dismantle institutionalized inherited disadvantage.
158 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 141, at 183 (“When we think of racism we think of
Governor Wallace of Alabama blocking the schoolhouse door; we think of water hoses, lynch-
ings, racial epithets, and ‘whites only’ signs. . . . Our understanding of racism is therefore
shaped by the most extreme expressions of individual bigotry, not by the way in which it
functions naturally, almost invisibly (and sometimes with genuinely benign intent), when it is
embedded in the structure of a social system.”); BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 79, at 52
(“[C]ivil rights organizations such as the NAACP and the National Urban League continue to
fight the enemies of the past, like the Ku Klux Klan or their Tea Party cousins, but not the
contemporary structures and practices that are primarily responsible for post-civil rights racial
inequality.” (emphasis added)); López, supra note 67, at 1723 (arguing that institutional racial
discrimination “constitutes a significant source of social harm” and “may well constitute the
greatest source of ongoing harm to minority communities” (emphasis added)).
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tices and policies that are the real problem—the stuff that is doing the heavy
lifting when it comes to producing and reproducing racial inequality in the
post-civil rights era.
When we read attestations of the relative insignificance of individualist
racial discrimination together with affirmations that individualist discrimina-
tion is the form of discrimination that racial minorities with class privilege
typically encounter, we arrive at following claim: the form of racial discrim-
ination that wealthier racial minorities typically encounter is relatively insig-
nificant. It encourages us to believe that the middle class is not really
affected by racial discrimination—at least not the kind that counts. We direct
our focus to the “discrimination that matters” (i.e., institutional) and the
people who our conceptual schema tells us are affected by it (i.e., the poor).
This thinking is put clearly on display in legal scholar Stephen Carter’s
reflection on race-based affirmative action, which he said “does nothing at
all for the true victims of racism.”159  Here, Carter proclaims that the poor,
for whom affirmative action does nothing at all, are the “true victims” of
racism. This permits us to conclude that the wealthy, for whom affirmative
action has done wonders, have not truly been victimized. According to
Carter, whatever racism the wealthy experience is negligible.  Or, at least, it
pales in comparison to what the poor endure.
It is worth repeating how this tendency to conceptualize class-privi-
leged racial minorities as typically affected by minor individualist discrimi-
nation has contributed to the rise of post-racialism: When the racial
subordination of wealthier racial minorities is made invisible—when we be-
lieve that racial discrimination has not touched this class-privileged group in
a way that counts—then, we, like Carter above, come to conceptualize poor
racial minorities as being racial discrimination’s only victims. If this is cor-
rect—if discrimination has only truly affected the poor—then we are invited
to imagine that the primary effect of racial discrimination is poverty. Indeed,
we are invited to imagine that the only effect of racial discrimination is pov-
erty—that poverty represents the entirety of racial subordination. Further, if
it is true that poverty represents the entirety of racial subordination, then race
and racial discrimination are irrelevant today. Race and racial discrimination
may be important when explaining the origins of current racial stratification.
But they are not important in understanding the mechanisms by which racial
stratification persists. Instead, class is key; class, today, explains racial
stratification.
This is post-racialism: the idea that historical racial disadvantage now
takes the form of class disadvantage, making race and racial discrimination
insignificant elements in any story told about present-day social inequities.
159 STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 233 (1992).
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III. OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO THE INVISIBILITY OF WEALTHIER
RACIAL MINORITIES’ SUBORDINATION
The discrimination-class schema outlined above does not bear the sole
responsibility for making invisible the marginalization of racial minorities
with class privilege. Other factors are also operating. This Part identifies
three.
A. The Conceptual Collapse of Race and Class
The tendency of many thinkers of race to collapse the categories of race
and class has contributed to the invisibility of the racial subordination of
wealthier people of color. The conceptual collapse of race and class results
in an inaccurate, and not at all believable, rendering of all racial minorities
as poor.160
One frequently can spot the conceptual collapse in the writings of third-
wave feminists. For example, consider a chapter written by black feminists
Barbara and Beverly Smith in the celebrated anthology This Bridge Called
My Back, a collection of writings by feminists of color that is widely consid-
ered a classic.161 In the chapter, the Smiths ruminate about the importance of
adding to the feminist movement the voices of women who are not privi-
leged along the lines of race, class, and sexuality. When they note that black
lesbians are more vulnerable to homophobic attack, they reason that this
vulnerability is due to the fact that black lesbians do not “have white skin
160 Several scholars have observed the conceptual collapse of race and class and have
criticized it. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 10 (2012) (noting the persis-
tence of stereotypes equating race and poverty); Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Union-
ism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1904 (1994)
(observing that social class has, at times, been “treated as coextensive with race”); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2035 (1991) (arguing that “key
proponents of the existence of the voice of color have conflated two distinct notions when
speaking of the voice’s existence: race and socioeconomic class membership”); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE. J.L. &
FEMINISM 13, 16–18 (1991) (responding to critics who accuse her of gender essentialism and
of ignoring racial differences among women by noting that “a theory does not become ‘essen-
tialist’ to the degree it discusses gender as such, nor is it saved from ‘essentialism’ to the degree
it incorporates race or class” and observing that when many feminist scholars discuss racial
differences among women, they do “virtually nothing with class,” thereby constructing all
women of color as poor). Interestingly, Johnson’s critique of the conflation of race and socio-
economic status includes hints of post-racialism. He writes that black scholars may privilege
the voices of poor people of color—and deny that wealthier people of color exist—“because
the major difference remaining between Blacks and whites, now that de jure segregation has
been eliminated, is socioeconomic.” Johnson, supra, at 2039. Johnson here states that class
that is the most relevant marker of difference, leading the reader to the post-racial conclusion
that race is an irrelevant marker of difference.
161 Barbara Smith & Beverly Smith, Across the Kitchen Table: A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue,
in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1st ed. 1981).
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privilege or class privilege to fall back on . . . .”162 Quite subtly, but also
quite clearly, the Smiths construct all black lesbians as poor. There is no
acknowledgment that there are black lesbians who do have “class privilege
to fall back on.”163
Consider as well white feminist Phyllis Palmer’s reflections on third
wave feminism.164 She writes that white women ought not to exclude black
women from conversations about feminism; in fact, she argued, they ought
to listen to black women closely, as changes in the economy were causing
more white women to lead lives akin to those that black women had always
lived—that is, impoverished ones.165 Hence, Palmer constructs all black wo-
men as poor. She writes that:
[T]here are areas of policy making that white women as research-
ers, teachers, and activists should be addressing and asking women
of color about. White women must do this both because more of us
are now living existences more similar to Black women’s and be-
cause we will become stronger advocates for the poorest women
by letting ourselves be directed by agendas set by Black, Hispanic,
Native American, and immigrant women.166
Now, if appreciable numbers of Black, Hispanic, Native American, and im-
migrant women were not poor, for example, it would be nonsensical to be-
lieve that the agendas that they would set would, as a matter of course,
represent the interests of the “poorest women.” Accordingly, in order for
Palmer’s reasoning to make sense, all of the women of color that she lists
must be poor.
The conceptual collapse of race and class is not found solely in third-
wave feminist scholarship; one can also find it in the scholarship of critical
race theorists writing within the legal academy. For example, Mari Matsuda,
a leading critical race theorist, once argued, like Palmer, that those who are
most the dispossessed in society ought to set the agenda for social justice.167
And, like Palmer, Matsuda offered a homogenized conceptualization of ra-
162 Id. at 125.
163 Angela Davis, a feminist and advocate for racial justice, has also fallen victim to the
conceptual collapse of race and class in her scholarship. Writing about the passage of the Hyde
Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal Medicaid funds to help cover the cost of indi-
gent women’s abortions, Davis observes that “Black, Puerto Rican, Chicana and Native Amer-
ican Indian women, together with their impoverished white sisters, were thus effectively
divested of the right to legal abortion.” ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & CLASS 206
(1981). Here, all “Black, Puerto Rican, Chicana and Native American Indian women”—to-
gether with their explicitly “impoverished” white counterparts—are poor. Davis’s rendering of
history completely obscures that there are wealthier women of color whose ability to access
abortion went unaffected by the passage of the Hyde Amendment.
164 Phyllis Palmer, “The Racial Feminization of Poverty”: Women of Color as Portents of
the Future for All Women, 11 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 4, 4–6 (1983).
165 Id. at 4.
166 Id. at 5.
167 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987).
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cial minorities as those who are the most dispossessed. She acknowledges
that, certainly, all racial minorities are not really poor. But she insists that
their history of racial subordination has made them poorer than they other-
wise would be. She then transforms this relative impoverishment into an
absolute impoverishment, thus constructing all people of color as poor. Con-
sider her argument that Japanese-Americans “bear the continued burdens of
racism. Though on the whole successful by standard indicators, many former
internees still have not recovered from the economic setback of the evacua-
tion [during World War II]. The Japanese American elderly frequently live
below the poverty line.”168 Here Matsuda asks us to discount the admitted
fact that Japanese Americans are “on the whole successful by standard in-
dicators” and focus instead on the elderly Japanese Americans who are
mired in poverty. The latter are being asked to stand for the whole
population.
The problem with collapsing the distinction between racial minority
status and poverty is that it simply is not credible.169 We are all well aware
that many racial minorities are not poor.170 Thus, when we hear arguments
that suggest the universality of poverty among racial minorities, we tend to
correct the exaggeration by assuming that the speaker is actually talking
about the poor. So, when Matsuda argues that the Japanese and Japanese
Americans who were detained during World War II “still have not recovered
from the economic setback of the evacuation,” we understand her to mean
that there are many former internees who are poor who still have not recov-
ered from the Japanese internment. This correction results in the complete
erasure of the effects that the Japanese internment has had, and may continue
to have, on wealthier Japanese people.
Again, when observers collapse race and class and assume that racial
minority status is equivalent to being poor, it encourages the reader to pre-
sume that the observer is not actually talking about class-privileged racial
minorities. This obscures the effect that any racially subordinating event—
like Japanese internment, or chattel slavery and Jim Crow, or the Holocaust,
or the forced sterilization of women in Puerto Rico—has had on wealthier
racial minorities; this group appears to have escaped any negative conse-
quences of the event. Importantly, this leads us to perceive poor people as
the only affected group. In the absence of evidence that the same process
that has disadvantaged poor people has also disadvantaged wealthier people
168 Id. at 377.
169 Another problem with collapsing the distinction between racial minority status and
poverty is that it suggests the appropriateness of collapsing the distinction between white racial
status and affluence. This collapse leads to the belief that all white people are wealthy. This, of
course, is untrue. Moreover, it leads to the complete erasure of poor white people—a result
that may not only produce bad theory, but may set the stage for significant political backlash.
170 See House & Williams, supra note 28, at 104 (“Although there is a strong relationship
between race and [socioeconomic status], they are not equivalent. For example, the rate of
poverty is three times higher for blacks than for whites, but two-thirds of blacks are not poor,
and two-thirds of all poor Americans are white.”).
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(although it has not led to their indigence), it becomes easier to believe that
the effects of racial discrimination can be seen entirely in socioeconomic
status. That is, it becomes easier to believe that poverty is the only conse-
quence of racial discrimination. What had its origins in race now plays out in
class. When we perceive poverty as the only form that historical racial disen-
franchisement takes, we witness the seedling of post-racialism.
B. The Problem with Descriptive Statistics
The intellectual shortcut that the conceptual collapse of race and class
encourages—that is, thinking that because an observer has not mentioned
the effects that a racially subordinating event has had on wealthier people of
color, the event has not affected wealthier people of color at all—is also
encouraged by the use of descriptive statistics. To explain, descriptive statis-
tics describe a characteristic that a group, as a whole, possesses.171 While
these statistics are helpful in understanding what is happening to a group,
they are not helpful in understanding how different parts of the group may
be differently situated.172 So, for example, when we read the statistic that
“one of every three black American males born today can expect to go to
prison in his lifetime,”173 we know that black males, as a whole, are being
arrested, incarcerated, and released on parole at devastatingly high rates.
However, we do not know whether poor black males are being arrested,
incarcerated, and released on parole more frequently than wealthier black
males, or whether black males in the south come into contact with the crimi-
nal justice system more frequently than black males in the north, etc.
Public health scholar Marsha Lillie-Blanton has written about the use of
descriptive statistics in the population health context, noting that because
descriptive statistics about the health of black people, as a whole, do not
reflect socioeconomic differences within the group, people tend to believe
that the statistics simply reflect the fact that black people are disproportion-
ately poorer than other racial groups. She observes that when viewing statis-
tics that show that black people, on average, die three to four years earlier
than white people, on average,174 people attribute this difference to the
widely known fact that black people are disproportionately poorer than
white people.175 Essentially, the familiar fact that black people are dispropor-
171 See Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 412–13.
172 See id.
173 REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
MITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1
(Aug. 2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shad
ow-Report-ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6DM-PS2S].
174 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2015: WITH SPECIAL FEA-
TURE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 22 (2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
hus/hus15.pdf#015 [http://perma.cc/G47H-A6T9].
175 See Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 25, at 413 (“The practice of reporting unadjusted
descriptive statistics by race is commonplace and has led many to question whether current
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tionately represented among the nation’s poor causes observers to fall victim
to the conceptual collapse of race and class. When exposed to descriptive
statistics about the black race, observers tend to assume that the usually
damning statistics describing black people are damning because of black
people’s disproportionate poverty. In other words, we do not believe that the
statistics are actually describing class-privileged black people; instead, we
believe that they are describing those at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder.176 The effect is to make it seem that wealthier people of color have
escaped the negative phenomenon described in the statistic. We perceive
wealthier people as unaffected or all right. Their subordination is obscured,
and we are back to the process described above:
1. We perceive poor people as the only affected group.
2. This leads us to believe that racial discrimination’s effects are en-
tirely socioeconomic.
3. This leads us to understand poverty to be the only consequence of
racial discrimination.
4. This leads us to perceive class disadvantage as the only form that
historical racial disenfranchisement takes.
5. Post-racialism is strengthened.
C. Explicit Attestations that Race and Racial Discrimination Has
Produced Economic Advantages and Disadvantages
For years, race scholars have argued that race and racial discrimination
are mechanisms that dominant racial groups have used to create and protect
economic advantages. And these scholars are right. Racial subordination cer-
tainly has generated and protected economic advantages for white people;
conversely, racial subordination certainly has economically disadvantaged
various groups of people of color. However, this fact—that racial discrimi-
nation has produced economic injuries—easily is corrupted into the claim
that racial discrimination has only produced economic injuries, ignoring the
fact that racial discrimination has also produced sociocultural and political
injuries. This corrupted claim suggests that those racial minorities who have
not been injured economically—class-privileged racial minorities, it would
seem—have been unaffected by racial discrimination.
racial disparities in health are a consequence of higher poverty rates among minority popula-
tions rather than race-specific barriers in society.”).
176 Complicating things is the fact that some descriptive statistics of black people really
are not describing class-privileged black people, but instead are describing their poor counter-
parts. This is particularly true of statistics relating to criminal justice—i.e., the “one in three”
statistic mentioned in supra note 173 and accompanying text. See Forman, supra note 115, at
132 (noting that mass incarceration “does not impact middle- and upper-class educated Afri-
can Americans in the same way that it impacts lower-income African Americans” and observ-
ing that “one of mass incarceration’s defining features is that, unlike Jim Crow, its reach is
largely confined to the poorest, least-educated segments of the African American
community”).
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Critical race theorist Cheryl Harris’s classic article, Whiteness as Prop-
erty, is an instructive place to begin.177 The thrust of the article is to argue
that white racial privilege is comfortably understood as a species of prop-
erty, as it has acquired many of the characteristics given to legal property,
like the right to use and enjoy and the absolute right to exclude. Further,
Harris proposes that affirmative action programs are a means to destabilize
and dismantle this species of property.178 Throughout the article, Harris de-
scribes how race and racial discrimination have been used to enable white
people to enjoy monopolies over certain economic opportunities and, thus,
how racial discrimination has been economically advantageous to this group.
She begins the article with a story about her grandmother, whose ability to
pass as white had “a certain economic logic.”179 Acquiring a contingent
form of whiteness enabled her grandmother to get better paying jobs in
white neighborhoods and gave her “higher economic returns in the short
term, as well as greater economic, political, and social security in the long
run. Becoming white meant gaining access to a whole set of public and
private privileges that materially and permanently guaranteed basic subsis-
tence needs and, therefore, survival.”180 In essence, being white was an eco-
nomically valuable proposition.181 Conversely, being black was
economically detrimental.
177 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1725, 1731 (1993)
(arguing that not only does whiteness satisfy theoretical definitions of property, but that it also
meets “functional criteria of property”—meaning that “the law has accorded ‘holders’ of
whiteness the same privileges and benefits accorded holders of other types of property”).
178 Id. at 1779.
179 Id. at 1713.
180 Id.
181 Roithmayr has done recent work that also demonstrates how racial subordination has
facilitated economic subordination, showing how “racial cartels” locked people of color out of
jobs and industries in earlier moments in our nation’s history. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 43,
at 29–31, 60–66. She demonstrates how these race-based economic disadvantages, which oc-
curred in the relatively distant past, have been perpetuated over time and have functioned to
disadvantage racial minorities in the present. In essence, she shows how race and racial dis-
crimination have produced, and continues to produce, economic advantages and
disadvantages.
There are many other examples of this phenomenon. Consider undocumented immigration
from Mexico and Central America. Anthropologist Nicholas de Genova and others have ar-
gued that the category of the “illegal alien,” especially because commentators so frequently
use it to signify Mexican migrants, is a racialized one. See Nicholas P. De Genova, The Legal
Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality,” 2 LATINO STUD. 160, 161–62 (2004) (“Mexican
migrants are . . . racialized as ‘illegal aliens’ . . . . Thus, as a simultaneously spatialized and
racialized social condition, migrant ‘illegality’ is also a central feature of the ways that ‘Mexi-
can’-ness is thereby reconfigured in racialized relation to the hegemonic ‘national’ identity of
‘American-ness[ ].”). He and others have also argued that “illegality” is a condition of possi-
bility for “deportability”—the status that enables the government to forcibly remove an indi-
vidual without documentation from the country. Id. at 161. This deportability makes it difficult
for those who inhabit the status of “illegal alien” to demand the wages paid to documented
members of the workforce as well as other workplace protections. See id. This produces “ille-
gal aliens” as an abundant source of cheap labor—something that is economically advanta-
geous, and profitable, to employers. Nicholas P. De Genova, Migrant “Illegality” and
Deportability in Everyday Life, 31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 419, 439–40 (2002) (“The cate-
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While few would dispute that race and racial discrimination have pro-
duced economic advantages for dominant racial groups, this truth is easily
perverted into the supposition that race and racial discrimination have only
produced economic advantages for dominant racial groups. That is, the idea
that racial subordination facilitates economic subordination is easily simpli-
fied into the idea that racial subordination only facilitates economic subordi-
nation—that economic subordination constitutes the universe of racial
subordination. If this is true, those who have not been obviously economi-
cally subordinated (i.e., class-privileged racial minorities) have escaped ra-
cial subordination in its entirety.
The truth is that while economic subordination is certainly an element
of racial subordination, it is just one of many elements.182 Racial discrimina-
tion has disadvantaged people of color economically, but also sociocul-
turally183 and politically.184 If racial discrimination is only about economic
gory ‘illegal alien’ is a profoundly useful and profitable one that effectively serves to create
and sustain a legally vulnerable—and hence, relatively tractable and thus ‘cheap’—reserve of
labor.”). Thus, race—in this context, the racialized category of the “illegal alien”—produces
economic advantages to American businesses.
182 While Malamud has done extraordinary work in bringing to light the racial subordina-
tion that class-privileged racial minorities endure, she nevertheless focuses on their economic
subordination—which limits her view of the disadvantage that they experience. She helpfully
acknowledges that “the poor do not have a corner on the market where discrimination against
African Americans is concerned. Black middle-class families are systematically disadvantaged
in comparison with seemingly “similarly situated” white families.” See Malamud, supra note
12, at 988. However, she makes statements that suggest that the market of discrimination,
which the poor have not yet cornered, is entirely composed of economic disadvantage. See id.
at 992–93 (“[T]he social processes through which the black middle class becomes and re-
mains economically disadvantaged are driven by and mediated through race. Ignoring race
misses the point and distorts the results.”).
183 “Sociocultural disadvantage” refers to the disadvantages caused by narratives that cir-
culate within society that describe people of color as pathological, deviant, dangerous, or oth-
erwise undesirable. These narratives are familiar. They include the black welfare queen, the
black male criminal, the “illegal” Latinx immigrant, and the aberrantly overachieving Asian
person. The concept of discursive discrimination, described in Part IV, should be understood
as a form that sociocultural disadvantage takes.
184 “Political disadvantage” refers to the fact that racial minorities probably do not enjoy
the level of political representation that their numbers might demand. See John D. Griffin &
Brian Newman, Minority Report: Evaluating Political Equality in America 195 (2008) (stating
that “whites are often better represented than African-Americans and Latinos” and that
“[t]his is true even beyond the effects of income differences between the groups and even
when minorities make up a substantial proportion of a constituency”). I state that it is probably
true that racial minorities do not enjoy the level of political representation that their numbers
might demand because the question of how to measure political representation is a hotly de-
bated one. See id. at 6 (discussing three different measures of political equality and political
representation). However, if the political representation of people of color is appropriately
measured by the number of people of color currently holding an elected office—an admittedly
controversial way of measuring political representation, as it assumes that only people of color
can represent the political interests of other people of color—then we can conclude that people
of color are, indeed, politically disadvantaged. See Karl Kurtz, Who We Elect: The
Demographics of State Legislatures, ST. LEGISLATURES MAG. Dec. 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-elect.aspx [http://perma.cc/H4SW-YB94] (noting
that only nine percent of state legislators are black, although black people represent thirteen
percent of the total population); Current Governors, NAT. GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga
.org/cms/governors/bios [http://perma.cc/4JDW-VUDB] (showing that 47 of the 50 governors
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subordination and poverty, then it would make sense to believe that poor
people of color have a monopoly on racial disadvantage, as they are the ones
living in poverty. Further, it would make sense to believe that our “race
problem” is past tense, living on solely in stratification along class lines.
Race would be relevant only when providing a history of how we got here; it
would be irrelevant when describing, and imagining remedies to improve,
the present. But if racial discrimination is about so much more than eco-
nomic subordination, then it would make less sense to believe that poor peo-
ple of color have a monopoly on racial disadvantage. It would make less
sense to believe that our race problem is past tense. It would allow us to
imagine that race continues to be relevant, staving off post-racial thinking.
The belief that economic subordination comprises the universe of racial
subordination likely contributes to the tendency of some scholars to deploy
class as a metaphor for race, using economic language to describe racial
disadvantage. Indeed, Harris describes white privilege as a “valuable asset”
and a form of “compensation” to poor white people,185 and W.E.B. Du Bois
once referred to the “psychological wage” of racial superiority that he be-
lieved white people receive.186
In fact, this slippage between class and race—which may slip into a
post-racial supposition that class is the new race—may be both a cause and
an effect of the fact that we frequently measure racial progress with eco-
nomic indicators. Indeed, scholars frequently use levels of income as mea-
sures of racial progress. Consider the argument that Wilson made in The
Declining Significance of Race that antidiscrimination laws and affirmative
action programs had dramatically improved the lives of scores of black peo-
ple.187 To measure this improvement, he did not attempt to quantify black
appear to be non-Hispanic white persons); Cristina Marcos, 115th Congress Will Be Most
Racially Diverse in History, HILL (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
house/306480-115th-congress-will-be-most-racially-diverse-in-history [https://perma.cc/
ZC9S-JFD5] (noting that 49 of the 535 members of Congress—seven percent—are black);
Tyler Reny & Sayu Bhojwani, Minority Representation Gaps, By the Numbers, WASH. POST
(Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/22/minor-
ity-representation-gaps-by-the-numbers/?utm_term=.7be46f7c2a40 [https://perma.cc/EL45-
H7BW] (noting that while black people make up 12.6 percent of the population, they only
constitute 8.1 percent of state legislators, observing that seven percent of Congress are Latinx
although Latinx people are 17 percent of the U.S. population, and stating that only 2.4 percent
of Congress is Asian American even though Asian Americans are 5.8 percent of the total
population). Reny and Bhojwani go on to note that “only 5.1 percent . . . of state assembly and
senate seats are held by Latinos or Asian Americans, far below their combined share (nearly
23 percent) of the population.” Id.; see generally Griffin & Newman, supra.
185 See Harris, supra note 177, at 1759. R
186 See Wiecek, supra note 67, at 11. If it is problematic to refer to a racial “psychological
wage” because it facilitates the slippage between race and class, then it probably is even more
problematic to actually quantify that “psychological wage,” which is what political scientist
Andrew Hacker attempted to do. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992). Hacker asked a group of white students how much
money they would need to be paid in order to agree to change their race to black. He writes,
“[M]ost seemed to feel that it would not be out of place to ask for $50 million, or $1 million
for each coming black year.” Id. at 32.
187 See WILSON, supra note 13.
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people’s political participation and representation, examine cultural dis-
courses about them, or measure the rates at which they die from certain
diseases.  Instead, he measured their income, observing that “as late as 1969
black males aged twenty-five to twenty-nine . . . earned eighty-three percent
as much as their white counterparts. In 1977, on the other hand, twenty-five
to twenty-nine-year-old black males . . . earned ninety-three percent as much
as their white counterparts.”188 Wilson offered this narrowing of the income
gap between black and white male workers as definitive proof that the U.S.
had made great strides in overcoming the historical racial subordination that
black people had endured.189 Now, there is no doubt that the U.S. made great
strides in overcoming historical racial subordination between 1969 and
1977. However, if racial subordination is more than economic subordina-
tion—if economic disadvantage exists alongside political and sociocultural
disadvantage within the universe of racial disadvantage—then evidence of
economic gains tells only part of the story. We cannot offer economic evi-
dence alone as proof that the race problem has been solved.
When one conceptualizes economic subordination as constituting the
totality of racial subordination, then one is led to believe that it is a misno-
mer to call present racial inequality a “race problem.” Present-day racial
inequality becomes nothing but a class problem (albeit a class problem with
racial origins), and post-racial, class-based interventions become the best
way to address it. Indeed, Wilson once embraced this logic, arguing that
because “the problem of economic dislocation is more central to the plight
of the black poor than is the problem of purely racial discrimination,” the
better remedies were race-neutral, class-based approaches.190
188 Id. at 177.
189 That Wilson understands economic subordination to constitute the universe of racial
subordination is even more apparent in his analysis of black women’s incomes. He writes that
black women’s “‘income and occupational attainment are closer to those of white women than
the economic position of black men is to that of white men’s. . . . [I]n 1977, among year-
round, full-time workers, black female college graduates earned on the average slightly more
($12,740) than their white counterparts ($12,456) . . . .” Id. at 178. He concludes that “in 1977
the major job-market problems confronting black women were associated with sexual rather
than racial status.” Id. In essence, Wilson understands income parity between black and female
workers as all the proof that one needs to demonstrate that race no longer poses a significant
disadvantage to black female workers. Indeed, Wilson argues that if this group runs into any
problems in the workplace, it must be on account of its sex. He does not ask about the types of
jobs that black women hold as compared to white women (i.e., government versus private
sector), their experience working these jobs (i.e., how are they perceived and how does that
perception impact their interactions with coworkers), whether they feel empowered in the
workplace, etc. Asking these types of questions may reveal that, while black women have
achieved income parity, their race still matters. That is, asking these types of questions may
reveal that economic disadvantage represents only a slice of the totality of racial disadvantage.
190 Id. at 182. Importantly, Wilson reversed his position years later, writing that he no
longer holds the view that policymakers should shift their focus to race-blind, class-conscious
programs. Id. at 200. His revised opinion appears to be due to a realization that racial subordi-
nation is more than simply economic subordination. Wilson explains that he has come to
champion the continued use of race-conscious efforts because he has been confronted with
evidence that:
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Scholars have not only used economic measures to demonstrate racial
progress, as did Wilson. They have also used them to argue that race rela-
tions have not improved as much as the more sanguine reports would have
us believe.191 For example, Bonilla-Silva has observed that society has taken
the growth and success of the black middle class, measured by commonly
used economic indicators, as evidence that the country has finally triumphed
over racial discrimination. He responds by using those same economic in-
dicators to counter those who would triumphantly declare the end of racial
inequality, writing, “To be sure, African Americans have experienced signif-
icant progress in several areas of their economic life over the past three
[C]hildren’s test scores are affected not only by the accumulated cultural capital—
cultural skills and knowledge—of their parents, but also by the accumulated cultural
capital of their grandparents, meaning that it could take several generations before
adjustments in socioeconomic inequality produce their full benefits. Thus, if we were
to rely solely on the standard criteria for college admission, such as SAT scores,
even many children from black middle-income families would be denied admission
in favor of middle-income whites, who are not weighted down by the accumulation
of disadvantages that stem from racial restrictions and who, therefore, tend to score
higher on the SAT and similar conventional tests. For all these reasons, the success
of younger educated blacks remains heavily dependent on affirmative action pro-
grams, whereby more flexible criteria of evaluation are used to gauge potential to
succeed.
Id. at 201. Wilson can be heard to argue that racial subordination is more than economic
subordination, as even when economic subordination has been overcome and income parity
has been achieved, black people lack “cultural skills and knowledge” due to the “accumula-
tion of disadvantages that stem from racial restrictions.” That is, Wilson can be heard to argue
that within the universe of racial disadvantage exists economic and cultural disadvantage.
Thus, he claims, evidence that the economic disadvantage has been overcome does not speak
at all to whether cultural disadvantages have been similarly overcome. The persistence of cul-
tural disadvantages signifies the persistence of racial disadvantages. Accordingly, he concludes
that class-based interventions alone are insufficient.
However, Wilson’s statement that “it could take several generations before adjustments in
socioeconomic inequality produce their full benefits” complicates things. While he acknowl-
edges that economic and cultural disadvantage are both found within universe of racial disad-
vantage, the above statement appears to suggest that he believes that economic equality is
actually the means to achieving cultural equality; it is just that it takes some time before
economic equality generates its “full benefits.” If this is, indeed, what Wilson is arguing, then
he is still making a post-racial argument. He still believes that class-based interventions are the
lever with which one can eliminate all racial disadvantages; it is simply that one needs to wait
a long time before these interventions will bear their full fruit.
191 This was the reason why sociologist E. Franklin Frazier penned his damning, contro-
versial critique of the black middle class, BLACK BOURGEOISIE: THE BOOK THAT BROUGHT THE
SHOCK OF SELF-REVELATION TO MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS IN AMERICA (1957). He offered that
he wrote the book because “[t]he picture which white Americans wanted to present to the
world was that although Negroes had been enslaved and had suffered many disabilities since
Emancipation, on the whole they were well off economically, had gained civil rights, and had
improved their social status.” Id. at 10. He had hoped that his book would shatter this sanguine
picture of racial progress, demonstrating that “Negroes were not only at the bottom of the
economic ladder but that all the pretended economic gains which Negroes were supposed to
have made had not changed fundamentally their relative economic position.” Id. at 11. Essen-
tially, Franklin endeavored to show that if economic progress measures racial progress, then
there had been very little racial progress. This, he hoped, would help to disprove the myth that
chattel slavery was not that bad, proving that that it was, instead, “a cruel and barbaric system
that annihilated the Negro as a person . . . .” Id. at 10.
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decades . . . . Yet their overall economic situation relative to whites has not
advanced that much.”192 He goes on to note that there is still a gap in earn-
ings between black and white workers with similar characteristics. While the
gap for black men was fourteen percent in 1980, it had increased to sixteen
percent by 1985.193
Bonilla-Silva’s work is laudable; for those of us who believe that the
country still has a race problem and are dissatisfied with attestations that the
nation has arrived at its post-racial utopia, it certainly is helpful to show that
black people economically lag behind their similarly situated white counter-
parts.194 However, if, as this article posits, economic measures of racial pro-
gress contribute to the perception that the race problem is, at bottom, an
economic one, then such counterattacks may be problematic—especially
when there is an absence both of noneconomic measures of racial progress
and a theory of noneconomic aspects of racial disadvantage.195
Even when studies appear to be interested in measuring racial progress
with noneconomic measures, many of these noneconomic measures are re-
vealed to be, at bottom, about dollars and cents. Consider Feagin’s and Bar-
nett’s analysis of Brown v. Board and the ultimate inability of the case to
achieve actual racial integration of public schools.196 Initially, Feagin and
Barnett evaluate racial progress by the number of children of color who at-
192 See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 79, at 44.
193 Id. at 46. See also Pager & Shepherd, supra note 57, at 187 (noting that the “wages of
both blacks and Hispanics continue to lag well behind those of whites”).
194 It is worth noting that some of the literature that shows economic inequality between
similarly situated black and white people is incredibly damning. Roithmayr’s work offers a
particularly unfavorable assessment of racial progress when measured through income and
wealth. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 43, at 2–6 (noting that the gap in wealth between black
and white families increased fourfold in the last two decades, that poor students of color attend
underfunded schools relative to their white counterparts, and that black people have been shut
out of white people’s social networks, which can partially explain gaps in wages and employ-
ment). While Roithmayr’s investigation is centered on demonstrating how “white advantage”
from previous historical periods is locked in through everyday choices made in the present
day, it is noteworthy that the only advantages (and, implicitly, disadvantages) that she dis-
cusses are economic. See id. at 8–9 (noting that during Jim Crow, white “racial cartels . . .
generate[d] monopoly profits by excluding competitors,” were able to “keep for themselves
the best houses, in the best neighborhoods, with the wealthiest neighbors,” and worked to
divide “the labor market into two racially identifiable segments” with “white unions
earn[ing] the highest wages, in the most prestigious jobs,” and going on to show how white
people currently reap the benefits of these ill-gotten historical advantages, as they manifest in
present-day economic inequality between the racial groups).
195 It is worth mentioning that it is not a sign of intellectual laziness to measure racial
progress with economic indicators, nor is it a sign of intellectual laziness to use economic
indicators to counter the argument that the nation has made great gains in racial progress.
Indeed, this article begins by documenting the racial subordination of class-privileged black
people, and three out of the four measures of that subordination were economic. See supra
notes 20–61 and accompanying text (documenting inequality between the black and white
middle classes along lines of neighborhood quality, income, wealth—and health). At present,
the tendency to measure racial progress with economic indicators may be a consequence of the
fact that we have not seen the need to create noneconomic indicators of racial progress.
196 Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure: How Systemic Racism
Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1099 (2004).
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tend schools that are not majority-minority.197 Now, evaluating racial pro-
gress through this measure may lead to productive investigations into the
noneconomic effects of racial segregation and integration.  For example, one
might empirically document how children’s daily interactions with children
of other races lead to the dismantling of negative racial discourses and cul-
tural narratives about the racial other; conversely, one might empirically
document how racially isolated children do not have the tools with which to
challenge these discourses and narratives.198 However, Feagin and Barnett do
not measure the number of children of color who attend schools that are not
majority-minority in order to ask such questions about the noneconomic dis-
advantages of racial segregation. Instead, they use this measurement of ra-
cial progress in order to make an argument that segregation functions to
keep money away from students of color. That is, Feagin and Barnett pro-
pose that enduring school segregation is a problem because it economically
disadvantages nonwhite students. As they note, “school desegregation is im-
portant for segregated children of color because, as is often said, ‘green fol-
lows white’—that is, schools with white student majorities typically get
better educational resources from those (usually white) officials who have
the power to provide such socioeconomic resources.”199 Indeed, for these
197 Id. at 1100 (“Never in U.S. history has there been a year when even half the country’s
black children attended schools where a majority of children were white.”).
198 Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, With Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v. Bollinger
in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1, 36, 45 (2009).
199 Feagin & Barnett, supra note 196, at 1101. See also BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 79, at R
26–27  (“As a consequence of resegregation during the decade of the 1990s, U.S. schools were
more segregated in the 2000–2001 school year than in 1970. The relevance of this fact is that
. . . [s]egregated schools are still profoundly unequal. Inner-city minority schools, in sharp
contrast to white suburban schools, lack decent buildings, are overcrowded, have outdated
equipment—if they have equipment at all—do not have enough textbooks for their students,
lack library resources, are technologically behind, and pay their teaching and administrative
staff less . . . .”).
Indeed, Feagin and Barnett conceptualize civil rights activists’ fight against segregated
schools in the 1950s and 1960s as one that was primarily motivated by their desire to access
the economic resources that white schools monopolized. They write, “From the beginning,
black parents and community leaders sought desegregation primarily to secure greater access
to educational and related socioeconomic resources. They did not seek desegregation because
they felt that black children needed to sit with whites to be educated. The assumption has
always been that better school resources come in racially desegregated schools, and this in turn
usually means better learning environments and greater achievements for children of color.”
Feagin & Barnett, supra note 196, at 1110. Interestingly, Feagin and Barnett understand black R
parents and community leaders to have been largely unconcerned with the denial of dignity
and humanity that is part and parcel of the separatist mandate that black students could not
share educational spaces with white students. They understand these groups to be, on the
whole, unbothered by the fact that the purpose and effect of de jure segregation was to declare
black inferiority and white superiority. Instead, Feagin and Barnett argue that, for these revo-
lutionaries, it all came down to money. See also Harris, supra note 177, at 1751–52 (arguing
that the Court in Brown v. Board was “unwilling to acknowledge any right to equality of
resources,” thus ignoring the fact that a “very real aspect of injury was that legalized race
segregation structured material inequalities into all socioeconomic relations and institutions,
including publicly funded schools” and contending that the Court’s statement that “separate is
inherently unequal” “failed to expose the problem of substantive inequality in material terms
produced by white domination and race segregation”).
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researchers, integrated schools are important not only because they achieve
racial progress in the form of economic parity in “socioeconomic re-
sources,” but also because they achieve racial progress in the form of contin-
ued economic gains for children of color:
School desegregation has brought African American, Latino, Na-
tive American, Asian American, and other students of color im-
proved access to important job networks, most of which are
controlled by white employers. Often greater in desegregated
schools, networking resources help students later on in securing
good jobs and advanced education. Black students from desegre-
gated, substantially white schools typically are more successful in
entering into the high-paying job and college networks than those
students from traditionally segregated schools.200
Of course, all of these things are likely true, and they are definitely
important. However, focusing solely on the economic benefits of racial inte-
gration obscures the noneconomic benefits of racial integration. And when
one obscures the noneconomic benefits of racial integration, one tends to
obscure the noneconomic harms of racial segregation—and racial discrimi-
nation, generally. When the noneconomic harms of racial discrimination are
hidden, it makes it seem as if the tragedy of racial discrimination is entirely
an economic one. Further, it leads us to reason that the problem of racial
discrimination will be solved when we have resolved all of our economic
issues—when people of color have access to “high-paying job and college
networks,” for example. This logic, of course, suggests that the problem of
racial discrimination has been solved for class-privileged people of color,
whose class privilege seems to suggest that they have access to “high-paying
jobs and college networks” and that their economic issues have, indeed,
been resolved. The idea that racial discrimination does not affect class-privi-
leged people of color is fertile ground for post-racialism.
It seems clear that the theories of racial discrimination that thinkers of
race have offered are no longer sufficient. The racial discrimination binary—
wherein there is only institutional discrimination and individualist discrimi-
nation—is quite unsatisfactory. As explained above, it fails because its logic
leads to the discrimination-class schema, which, in turn, leads to the conclu-
sion that the racial discrimination that wealthier people of color experience
is either insignificant or nonexistent. This, consequently, creates a context
wherein post-racialism can develop and flourish.
Thus, race scholars need to complicate the racial discrimination binary
and expand our theories of racial discrimination if our scholarship is to de-
scribe what is going on in the world around us. The following Part embarks
on this endeavor of complication. It thinks through how we might destabilize
the discrimination-class schema and interrupt the work that it does to hide
200 Feagin & Barnett, supra note 196, at 1110–11. R
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the racial disadvantages that wealthier people of color endure. It proposes
that if we hope to make legible the subordination that wealthier people of
color experience on account of race—an illegibility that supports post-racial-
ism—the most effective thing we might do is identify and theorize
noneconomic disadvantages that racial discrimination produces.
IV. DESTABILIZING THE DISCRIMINATION-CLASS SCHEMA
What can those who are committed to racial justice do to make visible
the marginalization that wealthier people of color experience? Fortunately,
there are several interventions at our disposal.
We might begin by ceasing to diminish the importance of individualist
racial discrimination, the variety of discrimination that the discrimination-
class schema offers as the most predominate form of discrimination affect-
ing wealthier people of color. This intervention is logical because the dis-
crimination-class schema makes sense to a lot of people—across political
orientations.201 As such, emphasizing the continuing significance of a strain
of racial discrimination that many people acknowledge as impacting wealth-
ier people of color allows those people to understand this group as a racially
subordinated group without requiring a huge paradigm shift in the way that
they conceptualize racial discrimination. That would be a triumph.
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency ought to go a long way
toward revitalizing the sense that individualist racial discrimination is signif-
icant. Trump was elected to the presidency despite the fact that he openly
and unambiguously vilified “Muslims” and “Mexicans,” deploying racial
categories in a way that breached the social norms around race that had
come to mark the post-civil rights era.202 In so doing, his election did more to
demonstrate the power and persistence of individualist racial discrimination
than all the studies showing that black homebuyers and renters are steered to
different neighborhoods than their white counterparts;203 that “Emily” and
“Greg” get more attention from employers than “Lakisha” and “Jamal”;204
that black patients do not receive the same pain medications as white pa-
201 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing President George W. Bush’s
description of the poor people of color who had been affected by Hurricane Katrina as victims
of institutional racial discrimination).
202 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immi-
grants and Crime, WASH. POST, July 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-
crime/?utm_term=.23fec5311180 [https://perma.cc/WK7H-EH8C]; Ed Pilkington, Donald
Trump: Ban All Muslims Entering US, GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2015/dec/07/donald-trump-ban-all-muslims-entering-us-san-bernardino-shooting
[https://perma.cc/RT9Z-P7ZW].
203 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL
AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012 at 31, 55–56 (2013); George Galster & Erin Godfrey, By Words
and Deeds: Racial Steering by Real Estate Agents in the U.S. in 2000, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
251 (2005).
204 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 59, at 992.
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tients even when they present to emergency rooms with the same symp-
toms;205 or that white residents start moving out of neighborhoods once a
certain threshold of black residents is reached.206 Indeed, Trump’s election
has made many observers believe that when race scholars looked to institu-
tional racial discrimination and implicit bias to explain enduring racial ine-
quality in the post-civil rights era, these scholars had been overly hopeful
that the mechanisms that perpetuate racial inequality had shifted substan-
tially. That is, Trump’s election has caused many to think that when race
scholars proposed that conscious, dominative racism and explicit bias were
anachronistic relics from the past, we were wrong. Today, there might be a
ubiquity to the racial sentiments that once maintained the racial order of
things in the pre-civil rights era.
Trump’s election and the fact that it appears to demonstrate the health
and vigor of individualist racial discrimination—the subordinating process
that the discrimination-class schema proposes to be the modality of discrimi-
nation that class-privileged racial minorities typically encounter—may help
to bring greater visibility to the marginalization that class-privileged people
of color experience on account of their race. However, we might also make
great gains in the task of demonstrating the racial subordination of wealthier
people of color by destabilizing the discrimination-class schema altogether.
There are several ways that we might accomplish this destabilization.
A. Recognizing the Institutional Discrimination that Class-Privileged
Racial Minorities Endure
First, race scholars could show that it is simply wrong to think that
class-privileged racial minorities have been untouched by racially dis-
advantaging institutional processes. While these processes have not impover-
ished them as they have poor racial minorities, these processes nevertheless
have disadvantaged them.207 Further, it is important for thinkers of race to
emphasize that while some of the disadvantage that class-privileged people
of color may experience may be economic, this is not the universe of disad-
205 Kelly M. Hoffman et. al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommenda-
tions, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4296 (2016); Astha Singhal, et al., Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Opioid Pre-
scriptions at Emergency Department Visits for Conditions Commonly Associated with Pre-
scription Drug Abuse, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.01592
24 [https://perma.cc/JS27-MR7U].
206 Leah Platt Boustan, Racial Residential Segregation in American Cities, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF URBAN ECONOMICS AND PLANNING 318, 318–39 (Nancy Brooks, Kieran
Donaghy, & Gerrit-Jan Knapp, eds., 2011).
207 Compare BANKS, supra note 160, at 8–9 (observing that low marriage rates among
poor black people have received a lot of attention while the equally low marriage rates among
wealthier black people have gone unnoticed, and hypothesizing that the relative invisibility of
the marriage decline among the black middle class is due to the erroneous belief that “success-
ful African Americans are exempt from the influences that have decimated marriage among
the poor” (emphasis added)).
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vantage. There are other categories of disadvantage—including sociocultural
and political. It is paramount that we theorize these noneconomic categories
of disadvantage, and it is paramount that we theorize the identity and opera-
tion of the institutional processes that have impacted wealthier racial minor-
ities along these noneconomic lines. Potential questions to which scholars
might pursue answers in future research include: what kinds of effects does
the excess morbidity and mortality that class-privileged people of color ex-
perience have on their political representation and on politics, more gener-
ally? What are the discursive effects of the fact that class-privileged people
of color are sicker and die earlier than their white counterparts? How does
the fact that class-privileged people of color find it difficult to live in racially
integrated neighborhoods impact their political representation? What are the
discursive effects of this residential segregation? Indeed, how does this resi-
dential segregation make race in very particular ways? There is much work
to be done with respect to theorizing the what and the how of the racial
disadvantage that class-privileged people of color experience.
B. Acknowledging the Coexistence of Institutional and Individualist
Discrimination in the Present and the Past
Second, race scholars might destabilize the discrimination-class schema
by challenging the sense that institutional racial discrimination and individu-
alist racial discrimination only run consecutively—never concurrently.
Thinkers of race have told a historical narrative in which the nation used to
have a problem with individualist discrimination until the Civil Rights
Movement and the civil rights revolution happened; now we have a problem
with institutional discrimination. This is the narrative that race scholars
largely have accepted about racial progress. If the arc of the moral universe
is long and it bends towards justice, we can find individualist racial discrimi-
nation at the beginning of the arc, institutional racial discrimination in the
middle portions of the arc, and at the end of the arc lies a society that has
triumphed over institutional racial discrimination—a racial utopia. However,
this model suggests that the present historical period, the era of institutional
discrimination, is one that does not significantly feature individualist dis-
crimination. As such, it misrepresents our present in ways that obscure the
racial subordination of class-privileged racial minorities, those whom the
discrimination-class schema suggests are impacted most by individualist ra-
cial discrimination.
In order to demonstrate that the arc of our racial universe is not a pro-
gression marked by eras in which only one mode of racial discrimination is
relevant, it might be useful to demonstrate the simultaneity of individualist
and structural discrimination in the pre-civil rights past. Thus, what were the
forms that institutional racial discrimination took during chattel slavery—an
historical era that we uncontroversially conceptualize as the reign of individ-
ualist discrimination? What were the forms that institutional discrimination
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took during the Jim Crow era—an era conceptualized similarly to chattel
slavery? If we engage in these analyses and recognize that institutional and
individualist discrimination have operated concurrently in previous histori-
cal eras, it will free us to recognize the simultaneity of these modalities of
discrimination in the modern present, when individualist discrimination pur-
portedly is no longer significant. Moreover, to the extent that we conceptual-
ize Trump’s election as a shift in how we ought to understand prevailing
modalities of racial discrimination in the contemporary U.S.—that is, to the
extent that we understand it as marking a return to an era in which individu-
alist racial discrimination plays a significant role in producing racial disen-
franchisement and racial hierarchy—then we ought to remind ourselves of
the persistence of institutional racial discrimination in this new era. The in-
stitutions and structures that race scholars have identified as perpetuating
racial inequality via race-neutral, oblique, subtle, colorblind mechanisms
have not gone anywhere.
C. Identifying the Distinction Between Individualist and Institutional
Discrimination as a False Dichotomy
Third, we might destabilize the discrimination-class schema by show-
ing that the racial discrimination binary—composed of individualist racial
discrimination, on one side, and institutional racial discrimination, on the
other—is actually a false dichotomy. That is, conceptualizing individualist
and institutional discrimination as perfectly dichotomous and proceeding as
if the two mechanisms of racial marginalization are mutually exclusive to
one another may cause us to fail to recognize the complexity of the
processes at work. In truth, the line between the two types of racial discrimi-
nation may, at times, be quite blurry on the ground.
Consider the example of the employer who does not want to hire an ex-
convict, engages in statistical discrimination, and refuses to offer jobs to
black males because they are statistically overrepresented in the population
of ex-convicts. Is this an example of individualist discrimination or institu-
tional discrimination?208 When scholars understand statistical discrimination
to be a species of racial discrimination, they typically understand it as the
former: an individual has taken an act that harms members of a racial group
because they are members of that racial group. Formulated this way, the ex-
convict-wary employer in the example seems to be engaging in a textbook
case of individualist racial discrimination. However, there are significant
structural elements to the story. Many theorists have argued that the spectac-
208 Racialized policing is another example. Consider the example of the police offer who
wants to prevent crime, engages in statistical discrimination, and stops young black males
because they are statistically overrepresented in the population of persons who engage in be-
haviors that have been criminalized. Is this an example of individualist discrimination or insti-
tutional discrimination? See supra text accompanying note 151 (discussing Henry Louis
Gates’s arrest).
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ularly disproportionate incarceration of black males is a product of institu-
tional racial discrimination.209 Indeed, Michelle Alexander has described
mass incarceration as the result of “a tightly networked system of laws, poli-
cies, customs and institutions that operate collectively to ensure the
subordinate status of a group defined largely by race.”210 Thus, if our hypo-
thetical employer statistically discriminates against black males, large-scale
processes that have made black males an overrepresented population within
the employer’s disfavored group necessarily inform her individual decision.
In other words, her individual acts of racial discrimination are, in important
ways, products of institutional acts of racial discrimination.211 Because of the
frequently co-constitutive nature of the two types of discrimination,212 it may
be analytically incorrect for people to conceptualize the two as mutually
exclusive. Race scholars could destabilize the discrimination-class schema
by demonstrating this.
What this example illustrates is that individualist and institutional racial
discrimination are not perfectly dichotomous. As such, we ought to chal-
lenge formulations of individualist racial discrimination that are overly indi-
vidualizing. Conceptions of individualist discrimination at present tend to
disconnect the harborers of such sentiment from the structures that make the
sentiment “make sense.” A more promising conception would understand
209 See, e.g., López supra note 16; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of
Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1300 (2004)
(arguing that mass incarceration is a species of structural racism and contending that it “is the
most effective institution for inscribing [racial] barriers in contemporary community life and
transferring racial disadvantage to the next generation”)
210 ALEXANDER, supra note 141, at 13.
211 This may not only be true for contemporary types of racial discrimination, but also for
“old-school” dominative racism. For example, imagine a dominative racist living in a Boston
suburb who believes that black people are dirty, lazy, and violent and, consequently, engages
in terroristic tactics to prevent black families from moving into the neighborhood. This actor’s
beliefs in black people’s racial inferiority, and his consequent individualist acts of racism, may,
in important ways, be products of institutional racial discrimination. That is, because of struc-
tural forces—like the macro-level transformations in the economy that Wilson describes in his
scholarship, the siting of low-income housing in these areas, and the exodus of jobs and the
middle class to the suburbs—poor black people have been relegated to hypersegregated, dis-
invested neighborhoods. Because of the high concentration of poverty that characterizes these
neighborhoods, they become sites of physical disrepair, welfare dependence, and crime—that
is, the stuff that is taken by the dominative racist as proof that the black people who live there
are dirty, lazy, and violent. Cf. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE 10 (2006) (observing that racial meanings, “while originally only ideas, gain force as
they are reproduced in the material conditions of society” and noting that “the resulting mate-
rial conditions becom[e] part of and reinforcement for the contingent meanings understood as
race”). In this way, large-scale processes inform the dominative racist’s beliefs and decisions.
In other words, his individualist racial discrimination is a product of institutional racial
discrimination.
212 In order for individualist racial discrimination and institutional racial discrimination to
be co-constitutive, it is not enough for institutional discrimination to inform individual acts of
discrimination; individualist discrimination must also inform institutional acts of discrimina-
tion. This would happen whenever a person with an aversion, be it rational or irrational, to-
wards a racial group is responsible for the implementation of an institutional practice—or fails
to prevent the performance of an institutional practice—that sustains racial stratification.
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individualist discrimination to be far from a character flaw, but rather a be-
lief system that undergoes constant reality testing. We, as a society, have
erected institutions that have produced a world in which it “makes sense”
for individuals to fear black males; to believe in the procreative irresponsi-
bility of black females; to think of black communities as welfare dependent
and, therefore, lazy; to conceptualize Mexican immigrants as criminals, rap-
ists, and drug dealers; and to homogenize an incredibly heterogeneous group
of Muslims as potential terrorists. Accordingly, to the extent that there is
obvious and undeniable racial stratification and inequality, we ought to ex-
pect individualist racial discrimination. Such beliefs should only be unex-
pected when we have created a world in which there are no external data that
could be used to give them validity—when we have dismantled the institu-
tions that produce a society that gives those beliefs some degree of rational-
ity. Which is to say: we might destabilize the discrimination-class schema by
demonstrating that the racial discrimination binary is, itself, unstable.
Recognizing that institutional discrimination may help to constitute in-
dividualist discrimination allows for the insight that individualist discrimina-
tion is not necessarily a personality trait that a person either has or does not
have. That is, institutions and structures may produce individualist discrimi-
nation and create individual discriminators. And the converse is likely true:
institutions and structures can dismantle individual discrimination and elimi-
nate individual discriminators.
In this vein, consider, once again, the election of Trump to the presi-
dency. There is an abundance of ways in which we might understand the role
of race and racial discrimination in that phenomenon. We might simply deny
that Trump deployed racism; we might claim that it is not at all racist to
describe Mexicans as criminals and rapists and to propose banning Muslims
from immigrating to the U.S.213 This position avoids the necessity of interro-
gating the relationship that those who voted for him had to racism. However,
if we maintain that Trump deployed racism, then we have to ask why those
who supported him did so. There are at least two possibilities: Trump sup-
porters voted for him either because of or in spite of the problematic and
dangerous way that he deployed race. Both possibilities incite us to question
the origins of these orientations towards racial discrimination.
Conceptualizing an individual’s orientation towards racial discrimina-
tion as a character flaw or a personality trait leads us to conclude that Trump
supporters have always been racially biased. They were born that way or
became that way as young children. However, if orientations towards racial
discrimination are the product of institutions and structures, then we might
question the large-scale, macro processes that allowed individuals to either
actively support racial discrimination or simply countenance it.
213 See Lee, supra note 202. R
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The economy and the disappearance of middle-skill, middle-wage jobs
set the context for Trump’s election to the presidency.214 Indeed, one of
Trump’s campaign promises was to “make America great again” by bringing
back middle-skill, middle-wage jobs that he accused leftist policies of ship-
ping overseas or otherwise eliminating.215 Also constituting the context for
Trump’s election was the spectacular death and destruction that ISIS was
determined to produce in Syria and Iraq—images of which were broadcast
around the world. Although people and communities in the U.S. are, geo-
graphically speaking, far removed from that tragedy, the fear of terrorism
within the borders made the crisis seem very much local.216 Cultural transfor-
mations in the U.S. also formed the context in which Trump was elected to
the presidency. Obergefell v. Hodges signaled the discursive inclusion of
gay and lesbian persons and the families that they create into the body poli-
tic.217 This inclusion decentered the heteronormative family,218 which had
been fundamental in the nation’s cultural imagination since its inception.219
Moreover, in the early parts of 2016, it appeared that the country was well
on its way to conceptualizing transgender persons as valuable members of
214 Mark Muro, Manufacturing Jobs Aren’t Coming Back, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602869/manufacturing-jobs-arent-coming-back
[https://perma.cc/W2Q8-2CT9]; David Autor, The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the
U.S. Labor Market: Implications for Employment and Earnings, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS &
HAMILTON PROJECT 2–7 (2010), http://economics.mit.edu/files/5554 [https://perma.cc/7BA6-
EVVG].
215 Tessa Berenson, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Jobs and the Economy, TIME (Sept.
15, 2016), http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript [https://perma
.cc/4TBH-D4SS].
216 Acts of violence perpetrated in the U.S. by people claiming loyalty to the Islamic State
or who could be identified by race or religion with the Islamic State’s ideology—for example,
the Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, FL and the bombings in the Chelsea neighborhood of
Manhattan in September 2016—likely contribute to the sense that “radical Islam” poses a
direct and immediate threat to the U.S. See Todd Green, Is Islam Responsible for the Orlando
Nightclub Shooting?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-
green-phd/is-islam-responsible-for-_b_10449060.html [https://perma.cc/UL8K-4REN];
Renae Merle et. al., Suspect in N.Y., N.J. Bombings Arrested After Shootout; FBI Says ‘No
Indication’ of Terror Cell, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/18/three-mysterious-incidents-in-new-york-new-jersey-and-min-
nesota-raise-fears-of-terrorism/?utm_term=.76b88ee5e40f [https://perma.cc/TX79-PHBW].
217 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 2, 13–17 (2015).
218 Of course, Obergefell might not have decentered the heteronormative family as much
as it simply allowed lesbian and gay couples to occupy the roles traditionally occupied by
different sex couples. See Jeremiah A. Ho, Find Out What It Means to Me: The Politics of
Respect and Dignity in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination, 2017 UTAH. L. REV. 463, 506
(“Kennedy’s judicial extension of the right to marry possibly imported same-sex couples into a
heteronormative world. In this way, the Obergefell decision recognized and preserved the het-
erosexual presence of marriage, envisioned same-sex couples as seeking the right to marry,
and invariably played the dynamics in order to extend the right to same-sex couples by relying
on respectability politics.”).
219 See Jacqueline Hudak & Shawn Giammattei, Doing Family: Decentering Hetero-
normativity in “Marriage” and “Family” Therapy, in 6 CRITICAL TOPICS IN FAMILY THERAPY
49–58 (Thorana Nelson & Hinda Winawer eds., 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\53-1\HLC106.txt unknown Seq: 62  8-MAR-18 11:16
126 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53
the nation.220 These cultural transformations would seem like a loss to those
with a commitment to heteronormativity and a nostalgia for a past in which
sexual minorities and transgender persons were socially and legally marked
as deviant. Thus, an economy that contains fewer jobs that can support a
middle class; ISIS and the fear of Muslim-perpetrated domestic terrorism;
and the cultural inclusion of sexual minorities and transgender individuals
into the body politic together constituted the context within which over 60
million persons could actively support, or simply countenance, racial
discrimination.
Now, if we pay particular attention to the structural nature of the trans-
formed economy, the structural forces that allowed ISIS to develop, and the
structural nature of the cultural changes in the U.S. regarding sexual minori-
ties and transgender persons, then we can see how structural forces led to
the development of individuals who would support or countenance racial
discrimination.221
This insight might be an occasion for both consternation and optimism.
With respect to consternation, the insight that individual orientations to ra-
cial discrimination are not personality traits, but rather are structurally pro-
duced, may make us less optimistic about polls that show that millennials
overwhelmingly voted against Trump in the most recent presidential elec-
tion.222 If those votes were cast in order to repudiate the racism that Trump
deployed, this antiracist orientation is not something that is inherently em-
bedded in millennials’ characters. Instead, it is something that may shift,
change, and disappear in response to large-scale processes that envelop
them. At the same time, however, the insight that structural forces can gener-
ate individualist racial discrimination may be a cause for optimism, as it
suggests that there is nothing inherently enduring about the problematic ra-
cial worldviews that people have and the racially discriminatory choices that
220 See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to Bath-
rooms, CNN (May 14, 2016, 3:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/transgender-
bathrooms-obama-administration/ [https://perma.cc/C6TB-59JA]; Tim Stelloh, In Post-Cait-
lyn World, More Acceptance of Transgender People Expected: Survey, NBC NEWS (June 9,
2015, 11:48 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/post-jenner-world-more-accept-
ance-transgender-people-expected-survey-n371831 [https://perma.cc/22FQ-DPHY]; Lana
Ulrich, Explaining Bathroom Bills, Transgender Rights, and Equal Protection, NAT’L CONST.
CTR.: CONST. DAILY (May 6, 2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/05/explaining-
bathroom-bills-transgender-rights-and-equal-protection/ [https://perma.cc/9YYC-APEU].
221 This proposition extends the insight that others have made in different contexts. For
example, in response to arguments that criminality is a personality trait that the black criminal
possesses, race scholar Paul Butler has argued that structures produce the black criminal and
black criminality. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crim-
inal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 691–98 (1995).
222 Emily Richmond et. al., Dissecting the Youth Vote, ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/11/dissecting-the-youth-vote/507416/ [https://
perma.cc/7WK4-GUAH].
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people have made. Structural transformation can change individuals’ rela-
tionships to racial discrimination.223
D. Theorizing Racial Discrimination that is Neither
Individualist nor Institutional
Fourth and finally, an important intervention that race scholars can
make to destabilize the discrimination-class schema is to theorize species of
racial discrimination that are neither individualist nor institutional. This will
be a challenge, as we have thought of racial discrimination as consisting of
only these two modalities for quite a long time.
We could begin by developing the concept of discursive racial discrim-
ination, defined as enduring narratives about racially unprivileged groups
that exist within our cultural repertoire and that mark racially unprivileged
people as deviant from the norm that white people represent. Discursive ra-
cial discrimination operates to disadvantage people of color while simultane-
ously naturalizing the dominant position that white people enjoy.
Importantly, discursive racial discrimination is neither institutional nor indi-
vidualist; it is a liminal category of racial discrimination that defies this ra-
cial discrimination binary.
To illuminate this concept, it might be helpful to consider the example
of affirmative action. In Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, he
argued that affirmative action policies mark black individuals who gain ac-
cess to the institutions that implement these policies as undeserving of their
place there.224 The existence of an affirmative action program stamps onto all
black bodies the message that they would not be there but for the race-con-
scious allowances that have been made in the admissions criteria. Affirma-
tive action tars all black individuals as unqualified. Thomas argued that this
223 In this vein, consider the spike in hate crimes and hate speech after Trump’s election.
See, e.g., Melanie Eversley, Post-Election Spate of Hate Crimes Worse Than Post-9/11, Ex-
perts Say, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/11/12/post-
election-spate-hate-crimes-worse-than-post-911-experts-say/93681294/ [https://perma.cc/
4VGE-WHBF]. We might explain this phenomenon in terms of Trump having legitimated the
racially discriminatory beliefs that individuals held before Trump’s election, but had sup-
pressed given the social norms that repudiated such racial worldviews. See Dana Milbank,
Opinion, Trump’s Campaign Made it Safe to Hate Again. Will He Turn that Around?, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-campaign-made-it-
safe-to-hate-again-will-he-turn-that-around/2016/11/15/f7d69e6a-ab76-11e6-977a-1030f822fc
35_story.html [https://perma.cc/NJF9-QKES]. This explanation of the rise in hate-related inci-
dences is consistent with understanding individualist racial discrimination to be a personality
trait—an enduring aspect of one’s character that persists across time and social context. How-
ever, if we understand Trump’s election as having institutionalized racial discrimination in
some important sense—indeed, his election embeds the racial discrimination that he represents
into the executive branch and the federal government for the next four years—then we might
understand the rise in hate-related incidences as demonstrations of the ways in which institu-
tions and structures produce individualist racial discrimination. In other words, Trump’s elec-
tion did not necessarily legitimate racial discrimination; it may have created it.
224 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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was true without regard to whether an individual actually is a beneficiary of
a race-conscious program.225
There is a lot of accuracy to Thomas’s claims. Many certainly believe
that black people in institutions that historically have been racially exclu-
sionary—like the black students who initiated the Reclaim movement at
Harvard Law School—are not qualified to be there. However, this does not
counsel in favor of eliminating affirmative action programs, as Thomas be-
lieves. Rather, it simply illuminates the fact of discursive racial discrimina-
tion. That is, it reveals that there are persistent narratives about black
inferiority that exist in society—narratives that persist despite changed soci-
etal conditions. This is to say that just as surely as black people’s presence in
institutions from which they have been excluded historically is taken to
demonstrate their inferiority, their absence from these same institutions
would be taken to demonstrate the same.
The racially discriminatory nature of this discourse becomes more per-
ceptible when we observe that no corresponding narrative exists about white
people in these same institutions. We do not have stories in our cultural
repertoire that construct white people as unqualified for, and undeserving of,
the seats that they held in these institutions during the decades that featured
the formal and informal exclusion of people of color. Further, even when
white people are excluded from these institutions—when Barbara Grutter or
Abigail Fisher fail to win a seat in their first-choice school—they are still
constructed as qualified and deserving. Even supporters of affirmative action
concede their qualifications and their deservingness226; we simply explain
that a policy designed to expand access to these institutions has redistributed
their seat away from them and other qualified, deserving applicants.227
It is important to note that economic resources will not eliminate the
noneconomic disadvantages that discursive racial discrimination perpetuates.
Many, if not most, of the black students in elite institutions have access to an
abundance of economic resources.228 However, their class privilege does not
allow them egress from persistent, adaptive narratives about black
inferiority.
225 Id.
226 Notably, there was a salient contingent of commentators who were willing to question
the qualifications and deservingness of Abigail Fisher. See Abby Jackson, People are Tweeting
a Modified Beyonce Lyric to Mock the Woman at the Center of the Supreme Court’s Case on
Affirmative Action, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2006, 6:18 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
what-becky-with-the-bad-grades-means-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/5P82-2GS4].
227 See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
228 Valerie Strauss, Why We Still Need Affirmative Action For African Americans in Col-
lege Admissions, WASH. POST: ANSWER SHEET (July 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/07/03/why-we-still-need-affirmative-action-for-african-
americans-in-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/Y4KF-5ZGA]; Mikhail Zinshteyn, The
Growing College-Degree Wealth Gap, ATLANTIC, Apr. 25, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2016/04/the-growing-wealth-gap-in-who-earns-college-degrees/479688/
[https://perma.cc/H738-HMK8].
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It is important to note as well that discursive racial discrimination and
the noneconomic harms that it inflicts may also produce economic disadvan-
tages. Certainly, narratives about black inferiority may cause employers to
overlook black candidates for jobs or to pay them less if they are hired;
narratives about black inferiority may cause white homeowners to move
when there is an influx of black residents into a neighborhood. However,
discursive racial discrimination ought not to be reduced to these economic
disadvantages. Black people who have to navigate, negotiate, and negate
incessant discourses about their inferiority are harmed even when they get
the job and the high salary; they are harmed even when their new white
neighbors welcome them with open arms. It is not at all unreasonable to
believe that the inferior states of health that class-privileged people of color
inhabit relative to their white peers are a testament to this harm.229
CONCLUSION
This article has observed that the race-based disadvantage that class-
privileged people of color endure has been obscured, and it identifies our
theories of racial discrimination as responsible for this obfuscation. The arti-
cle shows that we have come to conceptualize two modalities of racial dis-
crimination—individualist and institutional; this is the racial discrimination
binary. Further, we have come to think of poor people of color as most
affected by the institutional variety of racial discrimination, while conceptu-
alizing class-privileged people of color as primarily encountering the indi-
vidualist variety of racial discrimination; this is the discrimination-class
schema. Because most agree that individualist racial discrimination in the
post-civil rights era is nowhere near as impactful as it was in the pre-civil
rights era, we conceptualize affluent people of color as impacted by the vari-
ety of racial discrimination that is not really that meaningful in modern
times. The suffering that they experience on account of their race gets dimin-
ished, and oftentimes erased entirely, as a consequence. The only suffering
that remains legible is that endured by poor people of color. The vividness of
the poor’s suffering, combined with the indiscernibility of the race-based
disadvantages borne by wealthier people of color, leads us to believe that
only the poor are burdened by racial discrimination. This in turn suggests
that economic disadvantage is the form that racial disadvantage takes in the
post-civil rights era and that class is the new engine of racial inequality. This
is post-racialism: the sense that race does not matter anymore.
As this article identifies theory as responsible for obscuring the race-
based disadvantages shouldered by more affluent people of color, it identi-
fies theory as the cure. If we are to defeat post-racial thinking, we have to
destabilize the discrimination-class schema. We have to theorize
noneconomic forms of race-based disadvantage. And we have to think
229 See supra notes 20–37 and accompanying text.
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outside of the racial discrimination binary and theorize modalities of dis-
crimination, like discursive racial discrimination, that are neither individual-
ist or institutional.
Developing our theories of racial discrimination—expanding them, ad-
ding nuance to them, sharpening them—is necessary. It is necessary if we
are to bring into stunning relief the marginalization that class-privileged ra-
cial minorities endure on account of race. It is necessary if we are going to
rise to the challenge that post-racialism—and now, in the era of Trump, post-
post-racialism—poses to racial justice. And it is necessary if we simply want
to understand what is going on in our present-day society. It has been over
fifty years since Carmichael and Hamilton introduced the concept of institu-
tional racism to the country. It seems highly unlikely that the conceptual
tools that were developed to describe a nation that was just emerging from
an age of legally sanctioned racial apartheid are as capable of describing a
nation that is a half a century into an experiment in formal racial equality. As
our society is not stagnant, the theories that describe our nation ought not to
be stagnant. They ought to shift, evolve, transform, adjust—ever-responsive
to the social milieu that they are designed to explain.
